


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Military Affairs

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Col Gen Yermakov Summarizes Political Influences 'Weakening Army'

90UM0158A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Nov 89 p 3

[Speech by Col Gen V.F. Yermakov, commander of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District at a Joint Plenum of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom and Gorkom: "For the Socialist Ideals of Perestroyka"]

[Text] Let me begin by saying that the Army completely supports the party and its undertakings related to the renewal of socialism. But, like the entire party, the army communists are also living through a rather complicated period of perestroyka.

Let us state it frankly that we have not always kept pace with the processes which are developing dynamically in society and directly in our military organism. Brought about by objective factors, at present they require fundamentally new approaches to carrying them out. For us there is presently no more important task than the practical assimilation of the requirements of Soviet military doctrine with a complete defensive nature, realistic measures to reduce the Armed Forces and a reduction as a whole in the outlays on defense.

All of us, certainly, would like to move further along this path. However, the positive trends toward a reduction in the military stand-off of different social systems, unfortunately, have not yet assumed an irreversible nature. Under these conditions the task has risen naturally of ensuring a reasonable and sufficient level of national defense security by converting the troops to quality parameters. The ways to accelerate a practical execution of this task was the subject of the Main Military Council which met in Moscow on 28 October. An understanding of this necessity was accompanied by a search on the part of the military personnel and the army communists for measures to ensure guaranteed combat readiness of the troops with a smaller number and lower expenditures of materiel.

From the example of our district, let me point out that the previous training year which is now being completed marked a beginning to a better quality of the troops. A principled evaluation was made of the mediocrity in the results of combat training and the negative phenomena of troop discipline. The offensive is being continued against improper relations in all their varieties, the moral situation in the troop collectives is being strengthened and the sociopolitical activeness of the personnel is growing. But the troop organism, as is known, does not function in isolation. Moreover, certain problems of society are even felt more acutely in the army. Here one can certainly put the question of the social protection of the military personnel, the exacerbating of interethnic relations, the treatment of the history of the state and army and many others.

For example, the cutback in the Armed Forces has brought about an acute need to improve the nation's

mobilizational readiness. However, with the transition to the new management conditions, in numerous production leaders responsibility for carrying out these tasks has declined sharply. And this is certainly a problem. Unconditionally, it is beyond the army communists alone to eliminate the existing negative features. There must be a pooling of efforts and business-like cooperation among all our party forces. First of all, it is essential to eliminate the deformations and the various anomalies of public opinion concerning the Army and its problems.

At present, we can no longer close our eyes to the fact that certain insufficiently thought-out steps to reform the Army and their tendentious treatment have led to reduced authority for military service. As a consequence, the work of preparing the youth for service in the Army has sharply lessened. The overall moral and psychological portrait of today's draftee has a number of shadowy traits. One out of every four inductee views the forthcoming service as a heavy obligation and wasted time while one out of three is in favor of serving near home and the possibility of establishing nationality troop formations. The number of Komsomol members declines from induction to induction. On the other hand, there is a growing number of persons with previous criminal records, with arrests, not employed or not studying, not physically developed and with addiction to alcohol and drugs. If one adds to this the involvement of many inductees of the work of numerous informal organizations with a negative focus, at the end we obtain human material which we must now employ to try to carry out complex tasks of military and political training.

By this I would like to emphasize that the social and moral functions of the Army have in no way lost their importance at present. On the contrary, the demands on the army as a school of education and under present conditions for reeducation are naturally growing. Just take the area involved with international problems. For us this is a practical matter for even in the primary military collective—the platoon, company and battery—representatives of many nationalities are to be found in service. We teach the youth to live together, in a multinational house and in a majority of places this task is successfully carried out. Although, of course, there are also numerous problems in our work. Under the new conditions, more responsible tasks confront the Army in the sphere of heroic-patriotic education and the developing of a respectful attitude toward the best traditions of the people, the Armed Forces and the state.

Understandably here the institution of the Army itself requires great attention, support and concern from society. And from this position I would like very bluntly to voice our definite dissatisfaction with that defamatory campaign which many mass information media have unleashed against the Army.

I am not speaking about the street leaflets of samizdat. We are in favor of a broad examination of army questions on the radio, in the press and by television. But we

want this treatment to be objective, competent, constructive and without the bias and one-sidedness in which many of the current articles and broadcasts have abounded. The policy of undermining the Army's authority is a far from blameless phenomenon. This has largely been related to the penetration into the military collectives of unhealthy attitudes which reduce the enthusiasm of the personnel for real military affairs. These ideological germs infect not only the soldier collectives but also the officer corps, and particularly its younger part. We have been forced to review now more than isolated requests from young officers and at times good specialists for being discharged into the reserves. Here, undoubtedly, the reasons vary.

And here certainly with a degree of validity is the problem of the lack of domestic amenities, the poor wages and the curtailing of free time. But basically such decisions are motivated not so much by the material discomfort but rather chiefly the present level of prestige of officer service. Certainly it is known that in the past an officer had to endure extraordinary hardships. But the high moral view of military service by society and its importance put material and domestic concerns in the mind of the officer in the background.

These considerations naturally lead us to the question: Who now favors the weakening of the Army? Incidentally, such attitudes among the officers are characteristic not only for the district troops as can be seen by the well-known decree of the party Central Committee. We would merely like that the measures proposed in it not be delayed but find a corresponding solution in the local party and soviet bodies, for this decree is not for the Army but for us all. However, on the spot it is now being carried out slowly and extremely weakly.

In concluding this thought, I would like to emphasize that without broad, complete glasnost concerning army life, it is difficult for us to count on radical changes. The gates of our military units are open to all of you so that you can really know the Army and not by hearsay. We have been and in the future will be the initiators of meetings between the representatives of the party, labor and educational collectives with the personnel of our district. In the future, we will support the desire of the youth to serve in the units and subunits which have honorific designations of cities, population points and enterprises such as Kirov, Porkhov and others. It can only be regretted that the desire to be in the military collectives and to meet with the men in the units has clearly and unjustifiably diminished in some.

We feel that we are united in the realization that we must have not a slogan but rather real unity between the Army and people. In turning directly to the program of the Leningrad party organization, the district party aktiv as well as the Leningrad naval base, the northwestern border district and the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Northwest and Baltic, in representing more than a many-thousand detachment of military communists, has approved the measures related to

the party position on military questions and the questions aimed at improving the sociodomestic needs of the Leningraders. These are acceptable both at present and in the long run.

In our opinion, a possible supplement to Paragraph 16 could be the development of active and ubiquitous organizational and political work to prepare for the 45th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. The program would benefit from this if we would more clearly reflect in it the stage of practical measures to prepare for the elections to the local and republic soviets.

Dedovshchina: How Offenders Escape Culpability

90UM0150A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant V. Maryukha, Military-Construction Detachment Propagandist: "The Victims Have No Complaints": How To Break Unspoken Traditions That Impede The Struggle Against 'Dedovshchina'"]

[Text] A good many criminal cases involving barracks hooliganism "come undone" in the courts or are returned for further investigation, after which some of them are dismissed. This means that a certain number of offenders escape accountability. Why does this happen? The article "Solitary Courage," published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for November 1, 1989, was devoted to this complex question. The discussion is being continued by readers, whose responses continue to arrive in the mail.

The article "Solitary Courage" is an attempt to look at the problem of dedovshchina [hazing], which is receiving wide coverage in the press, at a specific time coordinate—namely, the time at which the unlawful actions are stopped. However, practice convinces us that such an approach, though correct in principle, gets somewhat ahead of other, more pressing issues of combating non-regulation conduct today. The fact is that by no means all instances of barracks brigandage make it to a military tribunal. What happens? Can it possibly be that there are military jurists who can close their eyes to the criminal actions of barracks hooligans? Not at all. Only a person far removed from army reality and from a knowledge of the basic principles of Soviet legislation could think such a thing.

In the Armed Forces, the rights and interests of every soldier are safeguarded by the one-man commander, who has the power to institute or decline to institute criminal proceedings, if an action contains the elements of a crime. The unit commanders exercise this right of theirs on a broad scale (coordinating their actions, naturally, with military justice agencies). However, each instance in which criminal proceedings are instituted (or not instituted) is preceded by an administrative investigation ordered by the commander. It is during this stage that many cases cease to exist, never to be heard in court. Why? Because the absolute majority of the victims

attribute their "bodily injuries" to personal negligence; for example, someone will say that he was running, stumbled, and fell down. And if there's no complaint on the part of the victim, no procurator is going to try to file an indictment.

I had occasion to satisfy myself of this from personal experience in the course of two years' service in a military construction detachment. Instances of *dedovshchina* [hazing] are encountered rather frequently here (the criminogenic situation in military construction detachments will come as little surprise to anyone). Meanwhile, military tribunals last year convicted just two military construction workers in our unit of having violated the service regulations for conduct among soldiers, under Article 244 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. The figure for this year is one, although the situation has not noticeably improved. And this despite the fact that each instance in which barracks hooliganism can be suspected is carefully investigated (the unit's officers spend a considerable part of their work time identifying those behind each violation of regulations). And the process of establishing the truth sometimes begins with an effort to prove this truth to the victim, of all people.

The law is on the side of the victim, and the unit commander tries to defend the former's rights, honor and dignity. But will the victim help the military investigator establish all the circumstances of the case, so that it can be subsequently forwarded to a military tribunal? By no means always. At moments of candor, the victim might acknowledge that his injuries were caused by barracks hooligans. But as soon as the discussion turns to who specifically dared raise his hand against the fellow soldier, he nervously falls silent, which he explains with the worldly truism: "I have to live with them."

Indeed, a young soldier has to endure a great deal before he will name aloud the barracks hooligan. Unspoken traditions that have made their way into the army from the criminal world are alive and often prevail as yet. Mutual guarantees often doom everyone to a conspiracy of silence. From his very first days of service (and in some instances, even before callup), a young soldier assimilates a simple truth: It's better to tough it out for six months, to endure the humiliation and the abuse; for six months later, new guys will arrive, and he can "take out" all his frustration on them. The barracks "mafia" takes severe revenge against those who violate its unwritten traditions. The label "informer" and ostracism of those who refuse to conform are by no means the strictest retribution for betraying the interests of "*dedovshchina*". For this reason, once he falls into the trap of barracks hooliganism, a young soldier makes every effort to divert suspicion from his tormentors. He is genuinely convinced that his lot would not improve but only get worse. This is precisely why military construction worker Private V. Lazarev, who was methodically beaten by fellow soldier G. Dubrovskiy, kept silent for a long time. Only grave bodily injuries "untied Lazarev's tongue," for fear of becoming disabled at

Dubrovskiy's hands overcame the fear of possible retribution. And only then did the problem posed in S. Turchenko's article arise: The investigators had great difficulty finding witnesses who, following the victim's lead, were able to rise above the entrenched traditions. A military tribunal convicted Dubrovskiy and sentenced him to a disciplinary battalion. After serving his punishment, he returned to the unit, but his experience, as I mentioned, did not serve as a lesson for others, as his conviction was an exception to the general rule.

This year the military construction detachment has registered nine instances of nonregulation conduct and 23 injuries that are strongly believed to have resulted from nonregulation conduct (though the victims categorically deny this). And I repeat: One military construction worker has been convicted. And even in that instance, Private First Class Kh. Gayratov was prosecuted for by no means his first offense [zakhkod]. And by no means all his victims stated their complaints against him even in court. On the contrary, all of them, including Private Abdurakhimov, who had been discharged to the reserve for health reasons—namely, a head injury inflicted by Gayratov—appealed for leniency for the barracks hooligan. And Private Eshkobilov denied that the defendant had stabbed him with a knife in the inguinal region, even though Gayratov himself had admitted guilt on that criminal count. But this fact was not recorded in the indictment, for the victim filed no complaint. It's not surprising that the impudence and cynicism of "veteran" barracks hooligans sometimes know no bounds—that they sometimes go so far as to threaten to seek legal redress for the damage that suspicion has done to their reputation.

You can't assign an officer or noncommissioned officer to every young soldier, and you can't look out for them around the clock. Army activists and junior commanders have yet to effectively support efforts to enforce regulations in subunits. And so a young soldier has to rely on his own strength, finding himself one on one against a barracks hooligan on a daily basis. Indeed as they say, even if things aren't so good, you would still be alive: but to report to the commander—that court takes a while (and may, in fact, take quite a long while). In the meantime, the older conscripts are there, all around you.

"You came and you'll go away," military construction worker Kochetov told Justice Captain V. Grib, "but I have to serve here."

Alas, it is not within the commander's power to isolate the victim within the detachment, not to mention transfer him to a new place of service. Meanwhile, military jurists, in attempting to prepare investigation materials for a trial, request just that—the isolation of the victim at least until the trial, in order to prevent those who champion the "ideology of *dedovshchina*" from putting pressure on him.

What is the solution to this situation? The author of the article "Solitary Courage" comes very close to a solution.

However, transfer to another unit must take place not after the trial but before it, during the investigation of the incident. And we needn't discuss the economic expediency or in expediency of such transfers. The very guarantee of such a transfer will embolden victims and deter barracks hooligans, thereby striking the first crippling blow to the mutual guarantee system and to the unspoken traditions to be found in the army. And while legal protection of the victim is a task of future legal reform, in army conditions that mechanism can be established today, in my view.

A Mother's Grieving Heart. My son Andrey found himself in a situation similar to the ones described in the article "Solitary Courage." He was both the victim and the sole witness. Andrey was taken in grave condition to the medical battalion, where he was operated on to remove a ruptured spleen. The offender in my son's case, Private D. Petrov, is under investigation, as Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zhadobin, the unit commander, reported. But does this mean that the threat to my son's dignity, health, and life has passed? For other young soldiers whom Petrov and his ilk beat on other occasions are keeping silent. Even the unit commanders reported that my son had been beaten and undergone a serious operation only after my official inquiry, sent by registered mail. I consider the unit commander's citing a request by my son that he not report the incident to anyone back home to be child's babble unworthy of an officer and a leader. More likely, the persistent habit of keeping parents and the public in the dark as to what takes place in the army was at work. And it cannot be ruled out that my son was simply forced to keep quiet.

At 19 years of age, my son has been maimed. Nevertheless, he must now comply with a document that says that those who have had their spleen removed before callup are exempt from service, but that if a soldier's spleen is removed when he is already serving, he returns to his unit after leave. I am at a loss to understand this logic on the part of our military "lawmakers." After a person has his spleen removed, he must avoid very cold temperatures, refrain from lifting weight, get good nourishment, and take food only in small portions. Tell me, please: What kind of military unit can provide these conditions for a soldier? And just why is such a combat "unit" needed?

As a mother, my heart is pained: How can I protect my son? For this reason, I am appealing to the USSR Supreme Soviet, to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, to a number of other mass media, and to the chief military procurator.—T. Markusheva.

Latvian NFL Accused of Illegal Interference in Military Electoral District

90UM0158B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Col V. Myakov: "For Whom the Law Is Not Written"]

[Text] Candidate deputies from among the servicemen represent a little more than 1 percent in the forthcoming elections to the local Latvian soviets. I would say a rather miserly number. But there are corresponding legal grounds for this. This is that the districts for electing people's deputies from the servicemen can be organized only within troop units. Among the people, these are merely called closed sections.

Recently it has become known that the activists of the Latvian People's Front [NFL] who, it must be said, are able to put up their own candidate deputies in virtually all the electoral districts, have tried to "interject" their representatives in the closed electoral sections.

"Wait a minute, fellows, what are you trying to do?" said the representatives of the electoral commissions of the troop units with rather infantile directness to a number of the activists from the Riga rayon NFL councils ["duma"], "this is a flagrant violation of the electoral law...."

"Nothing of the sort," replied the contending fighters for democracy. "The law states that the social organizations have the right to put up their own candidates...."

"Yes, it does. But this applies only to the organizations operating on the territory of the corresponding district. Our unit does not have an affiliate of the NFL as yet...."

"You still do not know the situation," say the representatives of the council, smiling slyly.

How the NFL activists intend to put up candidates and hold meetings they, in truth, did not explain. But they did have to name the ranks of their supporters. It turned out that there were six of them or maybe seven employees of the Soviet Army in the military construction collective. These NFL members did not have any organization in the subunits. And on the day of the elections, they will all vote at their place of residence.

Seemingly the situation was now clear and the law had triumphed. But that was not to be the case. The NFL activists are for some reason little interested in the legal fine points. With a rush worthy of a different undertaking, at their meetings they proposed candidates and registered them in the electoral districts of the units as alternates to the representatives from the troop collectives.

The surprising thing was that only one rayon electoral commission voiced any doubts as to the validity of such a procedure. Having studied the essence of the question, it refused to register Inesse Vinkere, an editor of the rayon newspaper, as a candidate deputy. In response, certainly, there was a chorus of indignant voices on the council. The decision of the rayon electoral commission was appealed to the court. I do not know what the judges were following or what paragraphs and articles of the electoral law they used as a basis, but the ruling of the electoral commission was rejected.

A representative from the District Political Directorate, Lt Col S. Aleksandrov, spoke about all these liberties in the interpreting of the law at a regular session of the Latvian Central Electoral Commission. The members of this commission must be given their due as they spotted the violations immediately and recognized the claims of the troop units unconditionally. The rulings of the rayon electoral commissions for registering candidate deputies from the NFL in the closed districts were repealed. The question of I. Vinkere remains open since the Central Electoral Commission does not have the right to set aside the ruling of the people's court. Here the republic Supreme Court should have its say.

Need to Retain Military-Political Organizations

90UM0167B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 15 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Kokorin, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "No Retirement for Commissars"]

[Text] "I was an active participant of the Great Patriotic War, I began fighting at Moscow in 1941, and I finished in April 1945 in Vienna. I walked the whole war, there and back. I witnessed the mass heroism of our soldiers. Great credit for their courage and self-sacrifice belongs to the political workers who lifted the spirits of the troops to an unprecedented height. It is therefore all the more bewildering for me when I hear or read in the press today that political organs are no longer necessary, that they are supposedly a legacy of Stalin's authoritarian system, and that they have discredited themselves. What is this—stupidity or amnesia?"

A. Y. Dagayev, veteran of war and labor, Moscow

It is validly said that no man is a prophet in his own country. But would it be wise for anyone to claim this role? All the more so because it has long belonged to practice. Therefore if we wish to seriously discuss political organs, we would rightfully consider the historical experience, and rely on the facts. And they, as we know, are a stubborn thing.

Political organs began to be created in our country in summer 1918—first in the troops of the Eastern Front, and then on other fronts of the civil war. The people were their creator in the full sense of the word—they were created without any kind of party directives. Acting in response to a proposal from V. I. Lenin the 8th Party Congress established the Political Section of the republic's Revolutionary Military Council. Such that Stalin had absolutely nothing to do with the origin of this political institution: V. I. Lenin's role in this matter was by far more significant.

But Stalin did in fact devote attention to political organs—frequently malevolent attention. It was not without his participation that 20 military councils, 20 chiefs of political directorates, 14 corps commissars, 65 division commissars, 102 formation political section

chiefs, 92 regimental commissars and 7 military academy commissars were purged. And these are far from complete data.

History and its analysis do not permit us to ignore the following relationship: The more effectively political organs and political workers worked in the troops, the more successfully the tasks were carried out. M. V. Frunze wrote: "Who was it that introduced the elements of order and discipline into the ranks of our young Red regiments, formed to the sound of the thunder of cannon fire? Who was it that maintained the courage and cheerfulness of the soldiers and infused new energy into their faltering ranks in times of failure and defeat? Who was it that organized the army's rear, and established Soviet government and created Soviet order there, thus promoting the rapid and successful advance of our armies? Who was it that disintegrated the enemy's ranks, disorganized his rear and thus set the stage for future successes through their persistent and stubborn work? This was all done by the army's political organs, and it must be said that they did this brilliantly."

Our enemies also understood well the role of our political organs. Thus, recommendations to soldiers of fascist Germany sent to the Eastern Front suggested that commissars and political instructors should not be taken prisoner but shot on the spot. Field Marshal E. Manstein wrote that the German command saw them as the stablest bearers of Bolshevik ideology, cementing the fighting power of the Red Army. Unfortunately we are compelled to remind people even of this fact, which is obvious in so many ways.

There were periods in the history of our armed forces when not only was the idea of abolishing political organs and the institution of political workers entertained, but also attempts were undertaken to practically implement it. Such was the case for example in 1955. But literally 2 or 3 years later the practice of military development required abandonment of this idea. In 1957-1958 84 political organs were restored in the army and navy, and more than 150 new ones were created.

All of these are historical facts. But they are obviously insufficient for a well-founded reply to the question as to whether or not political organs are needed today. And this is the question which nags at us so forcibly in our present life. As we know, several USSR people's deputies returned several times to it in their speeches and interviews. Let's try to find an answer to it.

First of all we need to understand what it is that motivates people to raise the question of abolishing political organs today. The results of sociological surveys we carried out indicate that at least three groups of causes exist. First of all there is the low effectiveness or simply the ineffectiveness of some political organs. Second, there are the serious shortcomings in the style of the activities and the social position of certain specific political workers. Third and finally, there is the negative attitude of a certain part of the people toward political

indoctrination as such, resulting from their misunderstanding of the role of the party in the life of our society and of its functions in the issues of military development. Many of them do not conceal their aspirations for separating the army and navy from politics, and the party from the army.

But are these causes sufficient for the abolition of political organs in the armed forces? I am certain that the answer is no. After all, there is nothing surprising in the fact that people reject poorly operating political organs that lag behind the party's overall pace of perestroika. In the same way that they reject poorly working oblast and city party committees, local soviets, trade union committees, ministries, departments and institutions. Political organs cannot be an exception. In other words there are all of the grounds for making a distinction between the problem of improving the style of the activities of political sections and the issue of their existence.

Recently it was validly emphasized that the mechanism by which the social consciousness of people is formed, both in the society in general and in the army and navy, has grown significantly more complex. The country is experiencing difficult times. The idea of socialism is undergoing a test of strength by the most caustic "acids" of skepticism. Life is posing more questions than there are answers for.

In order that people would not lose their socialist reference points under these conditions, effective, purposeful efforts in political education of the masses are perhaps more important now than ever before. The logic of the life of political society points to the need for establishing social institutions in modern armies which are professionally (and I mean professionally!) involved with the problems of political education of soldiers, seamen and officers. Incidentally, such institutions actually exist in practically all armies of the world. They differ in their structure, manning, objectives and the means of reaching them, and they are called different things (frequently, political orientation organs), but the goal of their activities is the same—shaping and developing the political consciousness of servicemen. The military political leadership of these countries understands quite well the need for the existence of such an apparatus. During a trip to the USA we were able to persuade ourselves that the question of abolishing this institution never arises there. And this is obviously valid, if we approach military development from the positions of modern political realities.

The need for political organs in our army stems of course not from the fact that ideological indoctrination services exist in other armies, but chiefly from the conditions, goals and missions of our army. It cannot be said that the structure of the party political apparatus presently in existence is ideal. And the ways of improving it are obvious as well. We can hardly ignore them. But if we are to reject the existing institution of political organs, we

would have to first receive persuasive evidence that all of their possibilities have been exhausted. Hardly anyone offers such arguments.

Nonetheless, let's consider this question: What is the party political apparatus of the army and navy like today? What is its social portrait, and what are its objectives?

First of all, let's talk about its numerical strength. It is suggested in some places, after all, that it is huge, that it siphons off significant assets for its maintenance, and that almost one out of every four officers in our army is a political worker. But what do the statistics say? Political workers represent less than 2 percent of the total personnel strength, and around 8 percent of the officer corps of the army and navy. I think that no further comment is necessary.

Second, the political composition of the army and navy includes not only workers of political organs and subunit and unit deputy commanders for political affairs. Military journalists of the central press and of district and large-circulation newspapers work side by side with them (2.1 percent), as do workers of cultural and educational institutions (organizing the work of enlisted men's clubs, officers' clubs—6.6 percent), and instructors in departments of social sciences of the Ministry of Defense's institutions of higher education (5.1 percent), including 45 doctors and 1,143 candidates of sciences. Finally there are the select secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations who are released from all other duties. In the meantime, workers of political organs *per se* make up 16.3 percent of all political personnel.

Third, it would be wrong to assess all political organs and political workers with the same yardstick. An orientation toward political indoctrination of soldiers is not the only thing that they have in common. Political workers are also officers, capable of commanding troops and solving the problems of combat training. All graduates of political schools can command platoons, companies and battalions. Graduates of the Military Political Academy are capable of replacing a regiment commander. In a word, they all have their place in the fighting formation.

This method of preparing political workers has always justified itself. It is no accident that many political workers became commanders during the Great Patriotic War when circumstances so required.

Today, 99 percent of army and navy political workers, who are required to carry out the entire complex of combat missions in full volume, are rated specialists of military affairs. The overwhelming majority of political workers drive tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, shoot, fly and go on lengthy sea cruises.

Thus the modern political worker must be seen not only as a representative of the political apparatus but also as an officer carrying out the entire complex of missions concerned with strengthening the country's defense. This

is a fact which remains "behind the scenes" for many of those who insist on abolishing the institution of political workers.

Finally, one more argument. Political organs are precisely the principal organizing political force in the implementation of party policy directed at restructuring the army. It is true that not everything is going smoothly. There are grounds for complaints against political workers. But this does not give us the right to reject political organs as the implementers of party policy in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Obviously such a step would strengthen the positions of those who are already defending, with enviable persistence, a supraparty approach which is divorced from the life of political society in so many ways. Of those who would draw us into cosmopolitanism whether we like it or not, once again in conflict with the political realities which every person living with open eyes confronts daily and hourly.

In a word, thinking about political organs and forecasting their destiny, it is very important to weigh everything out. As submariners say when they embark upon a complex mission, we need to "check all of the compartments out." To consider all real factors. To rise above the euphoria of bringing the entire system down. It is important to listen to and to understand different points of view. To understand that we must create, and not destroy.

Medical Response to Dedovshchina

90UM0167A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Kondriyanenko, Leningrad Naval Base: "Medicine and 'Dedovshchina'"]

[Text] At first glance these concepts seem far apart. Nonetheless the problem of fighting improper mutual relations between servicemen was on the agenda of an instructor training course held in Kronstadt for executives of the naval medical service. Safeguarding the physical health of soldiers, the course participants noted, military medical personnel are called upon to promote creation of a healthy moral atmosphere in the military collectives, one precluding manifestations of "dedovshchina."

The analysis of the practical lessons of organizing and supporting efforts to prevent improper mutual relations, as well as to maintain sanitary surveillance over the working and personal conditions of the personnel or determining the ways of improving the activities of military medical personnel, was conducted, but not in the silence of a hospital conference hall. The latter was substituted by the training ship "Smolnyy," by the crew quarters of the rescue ship "Valday," by a training station and by units of the local garrison.

Colonel of Medical Service V. Yegorenkov, chief of the medical service of the Leningrad Naval Base, noted that naval medicine has long been the initiator and pioneer of progressive methods of treating various serious diseases. Today, however, in Leningrad, the recognized center of science and technology, the polyclinics and hospitals of the naval base are furnished with antediluvian medical equipment. Considering this, you can imagine how much worse things are at remote naval garrisons, where frequently the most highly necessary medicines are unavailable. The time has come to face these problems. Otherwise it is impossible to provide real attention to the people. Medical personnel occupied with "lobbying," scrounging and repairs are too busy to concern themselves with the psychological subtleties of work with patients.

Medical officers V. Galivets, I. Meshcheryakov, R. Isayev, V. Turumov and others offered proposals for improving medical support to soldiers.

Pickers Seek Return of Servicemen from Transcaucasus

90UM0287A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Berezhnoy, TASS, Baltic Military District: "Dialogue Instead of Banners"]

[Text] Uncertainty engenders alarm and creates a culture medium for rumors and idle gossip. I am once again convinced of this after speaking with a group of picketers at military district headquarters. They carried banners in their hands: "Help return my son from the Transcaucasus!" "We ourselves will decide the fates of our lads!" and "We are boycotting the Spring draft!"

It turned out that the picketing was organized by the Latvian League of Women. Those who joined them are the same people who are trying by any means to gain an advantage for stirring up the "Anti-Army Syndrome" even by speculating on maternal alarm.

I talked with the women. Few of them object to military service in principle. Something else troubles them: Are their sons and grandsons alive and well? The uncertainty and the long absence of letters frightens many of them. And here only concrete information can help.

We tried to calm those gathered and to find out what we could about their sons. We received information about Arins Surge and Maris Gobinsh from the special operations group in Baku. Both are healthy, asked their relatives not to worry, and promised to write soon.

We also found out about two other soldiers from Latvia—Andris Ozolinsh and Ivar Mikhelsons. They are also doing fine and they persuasively begged their parents not to worry about them.

And alarm about Yuris Abelis also turned out to be completely groundless. Deployed at Rostov-na-Don, his

unit did not go anywhere even though this had been assumed. The last person on our list, Ilgvar Irgens, also did not go anywhere. He remains as before performing his duty in Kazakhstan.

Military district commanding officers and political directorate workers attempted to calm all of those who were worried about their sons. The Ground Forces Political Directorate reported that all commanders and political workers of units and large formations located in the Transcaucasus have been ordered to conduct appropriate activities with soldiers so that the soldiers write home more quickly. A decision was also made to normalize delivery of soldier's mail via military transport aviation.

As for the picketing, would it not be better for representatives of the Latvian League of Women to establish contact with military district commanding officers, the political directorate, and the republic commissariat to receive the necessary information first hand instead of doing this? I think that those who are attempting to drive a wedge between the Army and the people and to speculate on peoples' feelings and on perestroika's difficulties are not earning the expected political dividends in this case. Discord and dissension do not bring gain to anyone. They should confront all troubling issues with mutual understanding and by keeping each other informed.

Problems With In-Unit Aircraft Repairs

90UM0150B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 2 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major A. Betakh: "Crack In The Skin: For An Aircraft Specialist Who Lacks Frontline Repair Skills, It Becomes A Problem"]

[Text] Volga-Ural Military District—The flight shift was coming to an end when an airplane taxied up to the central refueling station. After the crew commander signed the preflight log, indicating that he had no complaints about the equipment's performance, Senior Lieutenant N. Presnyakov, a technician, began examining the aircraft.

The specialist checked the condition of the airframe skin and airtightness of various systems. Everything was within the norm. When the technician began examining the right chassis strut, however, he noticed a crack in the skin of the escutcheon. The technician reported the defect he had discovered to Captain V. Zakharov, chief of the flight's technical maintenance unit: "We'll have to install a joint bar," the latter decided.

On the day Senior Lt N. Presnyakov made preliminary preparations, he calculated the needed quantity of rivets, ruled the joint bar for drilling, and selected the necessary tools. It seemed as though the officer had provided for everything. Time went by, however, and the officer made no progress in what was essentially a simple job. After several hours' work he had managed to put in only a few rivets. It was at this point that the chief of the flight technical maintenance looked in on him. The experienced specialist had to complete the repair work himself.

Installing a joint bar on the aircraft skin, putting in rivets, braiding the cables that control aircraft and engine through balls and eye rings [na sharik i koush], and welding and soldering—during the Great Patriotic War, for example, these operations posed no difficulty to aircraft specialists. Strangely enough, the technicians charged with maintaining modern airplanes and helicopters, whose level of education is incomparable with that of the aviators of the war years, very often experience serious difficulties when doing minor repair jobs that require a certain amount of mechanical training.

I must say that lately one hears both rank and file technicians and certain aircraft engineering service officials say increasingly often that the time of the repairman who worked alone, even if he was a master of his trade, is over, never to return. They point out that every regiment has a technical maintenance unit, and that it should handle repairs large and small—even the most minor repairs.

Meanwhile, aircraft specialists who served in Afghanistan are unanimous in asserting just the opposite. Like the frontline specialists, they often had to get damaged aircraft working within a short time, without relying on the repairmen of a regiment maintenance unit.

"We had to learn a great deal there," said Captain Ye. Prikhodko, an flight technician. "When a helicopter was in heavy combat and came back damaged, no one asked if you knew how to rivet or do other operations. It was pretty much taken for granted, so to speak. The aircraft had to be ready to fly at the designated time."

Lieutenant Colonel V. Doktorov, a senior engineer, said: "Not only the lessons of Afghanistan but also our combat training show that all aircraft specialists must have repair skills. These skills are needed in order to support flights from airfields, in making airlifts, and in making forced landings. So the ability to make frontline repairs on operational aircraft has by no means lost its urgency today. Unfortunately, however, this question is being resolved poorly in our country as yet."

There are many reasons for this. One of the main ones is that many higher military school graduates arrive at their line units with a rather low level of training in frontline aircraft repair. Young aircraft engineers hardly have a love for "rivets and tools," and they have less skill in this area than secondary aircraft school graduates.

The second reason is a shortage of repair materials.

"It must be admitted that the repair facilities of some of our aircraft units are truly in a critical state," said Colonel Yu. Fuley, an experienced specialist. Take, for example, the supply of such extremely simple repair materials as adhesive, paint, sheet duraluminum, rivets, and tools. Whereas they used to always be in abundance, today it's all but impossible to find them. Rear services receive negligible quantities of them, and it's impossible to buy them, you understand. I should add that some commanders and chiefs do not think this situation merits special concern or action, and they make the traditional gesture toward the mechanics group.

Yet a mechanics group sometimes consists of just one or two specialists who are Soviet Army civilian employees or servicemen and who learned the specialty of welder or riveter before joining the service. What kind of skilled and competent workmanship is possible under these circumstances? And the existing way in which specialists are acquired sometimes puts commanders in a desperate situation.

I also want to talk about the following. Every unit has a special frontline repair and maintenance site with written-off aircraft equipment. The site is designed to allow soldiers to sharpen their skills at repairing damaged skin, power supply mains, and so on. But one can see personnel at these sites in by no means all units. And if the soldiers go there, it's only to remove some part or instrument. But there are no signs whatever of practical repair work. In summer, these sites are overgrown with grass, and in winter they are covered with snow. Frontline repair classes that offer necessary documentation and visual aids are forgotten in exactly the same way.

I don't want to give the impression that nothing at all is being done in the district to train specialists in frontline

repair. Training courses for instructors in practical front-line repairs at an aircraft repair enterprise, with the issuance of instructor certificates, have become a tradition in our district. After the course, the instructors, under the direction of school and regiment engineers, conduct training courses and sessions in units. Contests among subunits in repairing damaged equipment, with detailed examination of shortcomings and the issuance of recommendations as to how to correct them, also make for an interesting activity.

In the opinion of some officials, however, the situation will get worse if a solution of the problem continues to be dragged out. The chief difficulty, in my view, is to overcome public opinion, which at some point began seeing some aircraft specialties as being of primary importance and others as being of secondary importance, into some that are prestigious and others that are not. Incidentally, frontline repair specialists rank all but last in this table of ranks.

For this reason, efforts to solve the problem must start with a frank discussion of the role and place of repair specialists in the organization of the training process and in strengthening combat readiness. Discussions with specialists also offer the following thought. At all levels, from the main Air Force commissariat to the aircraft flight, it is necessary to overcome the conviction that everything or almost everything in frontline repair depends on the personal qualities of the deputy regiment commander for engineer-technical services, that if this post is held by a sharp-tongued officer with a business-like manner, the problem will be solved.

Many aircraft specialists propose changes in the higher school training curriculum. In their view, the number of training hours devoted to the study of frontline repair in higher aircraft engineering schools should be substantially increased, and more practical training courses based on experience gained in Afghanistan should be taught. It would be a good idea to review norms for the supply of repair materials to units, as the existing norms have long failed to correspond to actual needs. The specialists' workday and moral and material incentives for their military labor must be put in proper order.

It would also be beneficial to include in certification examinations questions concerning practical riveting operations, the braiding of control cables, welding, soldering, and other mechanical operations.

Of course, it would not be difficult to solve many of these problems within the regiments themselves. For instance, time could be set aside for theoretical and practical training courses in frontline repair in the system of commanding officer training. Meanwhile, consider how thoughtlessly the work of technicians whose airplanes and helicopters are in the technical maintenance unit is sometimes organized! Their participation in the repair process often amounts to carrying out assignments like

"give me this, bring me that." So there are no grounds as yet to speak of any enhancement of their professional training here.

The problem of frontline repair has many aspects, and its solution, in my view, will serve the cause of enhancing the combat readiness of all aircraft units.

Radio Exchange Prior to October Crash of IL-76 Near Baku

*90UM0171A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Dec 89 Second Edition p 6*

[Article by Lt Col V. Korzhavykh, special correspondent: "The Last Flight: Actions of the Crew in a Catastrophic Situation Were Correct"]

[Text] Members of the crew of an IL-76MD military transport aircraft and a group of servicemen in the airborne troops who died on 18 October in the vicinity of Baku were awarded the order "For Personal Bravery" by a ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Our special correspondent visited the military air transport regiment in which served Lieutenant Yevgeniy Andreyev (senior flight technician), Warrant Officer Aleksandr Andriyash (senior aerial gunner), Senior Lieutenant Valeriy Vologin (assistant craft commander), Major Yuriy Gavrikov (regiment signals chief), Senior Lieutenant Aleksey Gashimov (maintenance group senior technician), Lieutenant Colonel Faskhaddin Zakirov (regiment navigator), Colonel Aleksandr Kalmykov (regiment commander), Major Igor Krayukhin (regiment engineer) and Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Pesterev (flight engineer for airborne equipment).

To be honest, when I was writing an article for PRAVDA last October about the disaster over the Caspian, the information I possessed was slim: a fire in the vicinity of the left engines, an explosion after the airplane struck the water, search and rescue operations.... Now this picture may be reproduced in fuller volume. A "black box" preserved the tragic chronicle of the 16-minute flight. It was found in the vicinity of the disaster.

I listened to this recording with a lump in my throat: No one in the whole wide world could have predicted that the people conducting the radio traffic were living their last minutes of life.

18:22:03-18:22:52 (Moscow time). Regiment commander Colonel A. Kalmykov, flying No 76569, requests clearance for take-off, receives clearance from the tower controller, accelerates his heavy craft to a velocity of 270 kilometers per hour, and takes off.

18:23:22-18:23:59. The landing gear is raised, the landing gear doors are closed, the landing lights are switched off, and the flaps are retracted.

18:24:07-18:24:58. The leading edge flaps are retracted, velocity climbs to 450 kilometers per hour, and the commander reports that he is ready for the first turn. Flight is normal.

18:25:02-18:25:53. The tower controller gives the O.K. to make a left turn, climbing to an altitude of 1,500 meters. The commander ascertains the course. Flight is normal.

18:26:03-18:26:54. Traffic with the ground to ascertain the crew's subsequent actions. Flight is normal....

Flight is normal, as in hundreds of other instances.... Calm voices, slightly distorted by rustling and shaking. They will remain calm until the very last instant. I was told that prior to take-off Kalmykov telephoned the regiment and reminded his deputy that cement trucks were to arrive that day, and the concrete had to be unloaded and poured mandatorily.... Totally earthly concerns. When suddenly....

18:27:43. A report from aerial gunner A. Andriyash: "Commander, our left engine is on fire!"

18:27:47. Colonel Kalmykov: "Activate the fire extinguishers!" (The command comes a fraction ahead of the mechanical voice of the automatic vocal warning device: "Fire, this is No 76569, fire, this is 76569, fire!")

18:27:57. A report from senior flight engineer Ye. Andreyev: The fire extinguishing system had been activated....

18:28:00-18:28:58. Aerial gunner: "Commander, I see flames!" Two back-up fire extinguishing systems are activated. Copilot V. Vologin reports to the tower controller that the airplane was going to make an emergency landing at the airfield of departure.

18:29:00-18:29:53. Tower controller: "Prepare to land, the airstrip has been cleared for you." Aerial gunner: "Commander, the fire is still burning!" The vocal warning device: "Banking is excessive! Banking is excessive!" Commander: "Is the engine burning hard? Distance to touchdown, navigator?"

18:30:03-18:30:58. Aerial gunner: "Yes, it's burning very hard.... The engine is beginning to fall off.... The flaps, the flaps are burning!" Copilot: "O.K., I'm not going to extend the flaps." Commander: "Lower landing gear!" Senior flight engineer: "Rear landing gear has dropped, the front has not.... Commander, you'll need to use the emergency lowering system." Commander: "All right, use the emergency system.... What's going on out there, is the fire out?"

18:31:00-18:31:53. Aerial gunner: "Yes, commander, the flames have died down, but it's still burning, at the front of the wing, looks like, but I can't see...." Atmospheric pressure in the airfield vicinity is punched in on the instrument. Copilot: "This is Flight 569, permission to land?" Tower controller: "Permission granted! Come in

from the right." Copilot: "Roger, cleared to descend from the right, beginning descent...."

18:32:00-18:32:59. Commander: "Low thrust!" Senior flight engineer: "Low thrust set." Commander: "Prepare firefighting equipment and ambulances as per regulations...." Aerial gunner: "Commander, I see fire again...." Copilot, to the tower controller: "Request ambulance and fire engine on the airstrip." Senior flight engineer: "The left front strut of the landing gear has not dropped, it hasn't come out completely, commander." Commander: "Use emergency manual!" Senior flight engineer: "Using manual." Navigator F. Zakirov: "Make your turn right for the landing...turn right."

18:33:01-18:33:58. The course is ascertained. Aerial gunner: "The wing plane is burning." Senior flight engineer: "The fire extinguishing system isn't responding, commander!" Commander: "Try again!" Senior flight engineer: "I've turned on the fire system.... It doesn't turn on, the valve isn't opening...."

18:34:00-18:36:58. Commander: "We'll land without flaps, with the wings bare!" Senior flight engineer: "The landing gear has dropped." Commander: "What about the fire extinguishing system?" Senior flight engineer: "The fire valve is plugged!"

Yes, Colonel Aleksandr Kalmykov makes a most critical decision: to land with "bare wings"—something that had never been done before with an IL-76. Just a little time would be enough! Could that be what the craft commander was thinking? Alas, they didn't know, and they couldn't know, that the wiring of the fire valve control system had already been severed by melted fragments of the turbine disks. The thread of life of 57 persons was stretched to the limit. From this point on, time was measured in seconds.

18:37:03. Flight leader: "Flight 569, go five (degrees) left."

:06. Aerial gunner: "Commander, the wing is breaking apart, the plane is burning!"

:13. Navigator: "Range—10 (kilometers)."

:21. Commander: "Fire engine, ambulance."

:23. Tower controller: "Flight 569, watch your altitude!"

:39. Commander: "Airborne equipment flight engineer, prepare to open doors and hatches!"

:42. Tower controller: "Eight to the airstrip. You're on course, Flight 569."

:45. Flight technician for airborne equipment: "Ready to open doors and hatches!"

:48. Commander: "Good, wait for my command."

:49. Vocal warning device: "Reduce angle of attack!"

:58. Copilot: "Commander, pull up!"

18:38:03. Tower controller: "Flight 569, do not reduce altitude, range 6."

:08. Vocal warning device: "Banking excessive!"

These were the last words recorded on tape. Then followed an explosion. If I could have my way, I would duplicate this radio traffic on cassettes and send them to surviving relatives.

Could the outcome of this flight have been different, could the crew have saved the passengers, itself and the airplane? The questions never stop. And this is easy to understand from a human point of view. The conclusions of the commission convened to analyze the disaster offer no grounds for arbitrary interpretations: "The disaster occurred due to unlocalized disintegration of engine No 1, damage to the fuel system, and fire, which led to the loss of the wing's supporting properties and its disintegration, and the impossibility of a safe conclusion to the flight.... Disintegration of the engine occurred as a result of breakage of the low pressure turbine shaft owing to disintegration of a shaft bearing."

This bearing bears a tragic legacy which I would like to recall today. It, this bearing, has what we might call a last name, first name and patronymical. The D-30 engine was developed earlier by designers in Perm. It was precisely due to this design defect that 10 engines were retired early in military transport aviation between February 1979 and September 1989. Now that IL-76s are "laid up," a careful inspection is also being conducted in industry. The engine was modified, and that's a fact. However, air force representatives feel that the modifications were not very effective. Clearly it's too early to put the matter aside. The tragedy is too great.

People died. Real professionals who loved their work with a great, devoted and low-profile love. They lived a worthy life, and they behaved in exactly the same way in the life-threatening situation. No one went for his parachute, even though every crewman had one nearby. I have no doubt that no one forgot for even an instant that there were half a hundred passengers in back.

But let me turn the floor over to a person who knows better and more accurately the details of the disaster that occurred in the sky above the Caspian—the commission general, Lieutenant General of Aviation Ye. Rusanov.

"I would like to emphasize," Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich told me, "that the crew's actions in the disaster were correct. The commander and crew maintained self-control and courage, and they fought to the very last moment to save the people and the airplane. The incident in the sky with the aircraft is actually unprecedented. And the crew's actions will enter the instructions and manuals, which will then teach others. The only thing is that the price of such knowledge is impermissibly high."

It is said that people visit the disaster site every day and toss live flowers onto the frigid seawater.

Chief Designer on Development of SU-28 From SU-25UT

90UM0233A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 27 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by K. Udalov and A. Fomin: "Armored Acrobat"]

[Text] The Special Design Office imeni P. O. Sukhoy was represented by five airplanes at the 38th Paris Air Show at Le Bourget. Among them, the SU-25 attack aircraft and its combat training version, the SU-28, intended primarily to train pilots in aviation schools and in the DOSAAF system, were shown for the first time to the world aviation public. We met with the airplane's chief designer, V. P. Babak, and asked him to describe the new aircraft.

"The SU-28," noted Vladimir Petrovich, "is not a fundamentally new airplane to the special design office. It appeared in the mid-1980s as a modification of the series-produced SU-25 attack aircraft, or more accurately, of its combat training version, the SU-25UB."

A decision was made in 1985 to design, on the basis of the SU-25UB, a jet combat training aircraft capable of supplementing and replacing Czechoslovak L-29 Dolphins and L-39 Albatrosses in aviation schools and aeroclubs. The airplane was made lighter by removing its armament. The craft's take-off weight decreased significantly, and its maneuvering characteristics improved.

The SU-25UT (subsequently the SU-28) combat training airplane first flew on 6 August 1985. The new airplane is intended both for training and for aerobatic sports competitions. In this case the SU-28 can be used to practice take-offs and landings (up to 20 times in a single sortie), piloting technique and aerobatic maneuvers. It can be flown at any time of the day and in all weather, and it could be used for training in instrument landing in the absence of visibility (using a curtain). In sports competitions the SU-28 can perform all advanced and expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers with maximum acceleration of up to 8G.

With introduction of the SU-28 into the flight training system, the chain of types of airplanes mastered in succession by cadets will decrease. A possibility for reducing training expenditures will arise. The higher flying reliability and safety of the SU-28 should also be considered. (In particular the airplane is equipped with an emergency egress system operating in all flight modes.)

In comparison with Czechoslovak-made L-29 Dolphins and L-39 Albatrosses, the SU-28 possesses significantly better characteristics: Its rate of climb at the ground reaches 85 m/sec, and its maximum speed is 1,000 km/hr. This makes it possible to significantly complicate aerobatic routines and correspondingly achieve good results in competition. The possibility for mounting four fuel tanks beneath the wings increases the ferrying range of the SU-28 to 2,150 km.

The SU-28 has already managed to acquire an apt nickname, the "Armored Acrobat." DOSAAF aeroclubs have been waiting for such an acrobat for a long time.

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Kasatonov on Inter-Service Contacts Following Norfolk Visit

90UM0166A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Vice Adm I. Kasatonov, first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet: "Reinforcing Trust"]

[Text] Exchange of official visits between warships has recently been playing an increasingly greater role in reinforcing friendly contacts between the USSR and other countries. And although a certain amount of experience has been accumulated in this area, I would like to express some ideas having practical significance from my point of view, based on a visit by Soviet warships to the USA this last summer.

Selection of the detachment command, and something which is of specific concern to the navy—selection of the visiting staff, are doubtlessly very important problems. The visiting staff has a large amount of difficult work to do in all of the stages of the mission. This is why the staff should be headed by an energetic, competent officer, such as what Captain 1st Rank B. Beregin proved himself to be. Staff officers must be capable in operational service, and they must be able to make decisions and quickly understand the importance of incoming information. The principle of constancy of composition must be utilized here to the maximum. He who prepares the visit must participate in it. Otherwise breaks in the chain of responsibility may be inevitable.

As we know, official work during a visit is assigned to a delegation which as a rule includes the detachment command and the ship commanders. However, during the visit to the USA the composition of the delegation was expanded for official reasons. It included the Soviet ambassador and his wife, and other persons. From my point of view it would be suitable to also include representatives from the branches of the navy in the composition of the delegation during visits to countries possessing large navies. This significantly improves communication and mutual study of one another, and provides a possibility for deeper exchange of opinions and views.

Writing the program of the visit is doubtlessly a complex and extremely important stage. The program usually has to be coordinated. Nonetheless the program must reach the detachment command in adequate time. Unfortunately this does not always happen. Moreover a program that has supposedly been coordinated and approved is changed and updated at the very last moment, or it is found to contain scheduling conflicts and so on.

I think that this can be avoided by preliminary work done through the naval General Staff with the naval

(military) attache in the country to be visited. No matter how busy the program might be in this case, I feel it extremely necessary to foresee free time for the detachment command on the third or fourth day. It is needed as a way to regain one's bearings, to work out certain issues, and even as a time for receiving certain persons not foreseen by the program. In Norfolk, representatives of the command of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and their wives and children, ship and task force commanders, and representatives from many staffs, including from the Pentagon, turned out to be such persons.

Official visits are unimaginable without various naval rituals imparting special significance to the event. In order that they could be carried out strictly according to the regulations, it would be suitable to schedule the ceremonies in greater detail in an appendix to the program of the visit. Experience shows that not all host countries are sufficiently aware of our rituals yet, and we on our part are unfamiliar with some actions taken in certain situations having to do with military honors. In such cases both sides naturally had to do some fast learning.

In Norfolk, for example, following a reception in the wardroom of the cruiser "Marshal Ustinov," the guests came up to the quarterdeck, where a concert had been prepared for them. This coincided with the moment of lowering the flag. It was very pleasant to see the American admirals and officers and their wives quickly realize what was happening, and rise to their feet. All servicemen rendered a hand salute while the women placed their right hands over their hearts. But in other situations there have also been embarrassing moments which might have been avoided with better preparation by the sides.

The most important function, one which elicits considerable interest, is the press conference of the detachment commander. It is usually held on the first day of the visit, and therefore it is important to receive the most recent information promptly from embassy associates concerning the host country, the local press and so on. In Norfolk, the hosts suggested conducting the press conference in their base movie theater, to which over a hundred press representatives were invited; the press conference was televised nationwide.

It is not easy to appear in front of such an audience. But with Soviet Ambassador to the USA Yu. V. Dubinin standing beside us at the table and actively replying to questions, the task was made simpler. By the way, I was called upon to get up and answer questions several times a day in front of the most unexpected audiences. But I was not alone. In Norfolk, all of our personnel underwent what was essentially a mass press conference. A few years ago it would have been difficult to imagine such a thing happening. But today, the policy of glasnost encourages and obligates us to do such things.

He who has participated in such visits knows how difficult material and financial support is at the moment. Unfortunately, the money officially provided in support

of these functions is clearly insufficient. For example, the estimate does not account for providing refreshments at press conferences, receptions of military attaches and other functions. But they are a necessity, particularly when the temperature climbs to forty degrees. And what about goodies for the children? We need to give some thought to doing these things. After all, no matter where our visits take us, the hosts have always offered us juice, coffee and fabulous food.

A little about souvenirs. Although the visit to the USA was supported well by the central authorities, we should for example foresee sports pennants when meeting with sportsmen, and perhaps exchange of balls, team insignias and team shirts, as is commonly done in other countries. We need to think ahead of time about what gifts to give to ship wardrooms and various associations. All of these kinds of things are foreseen by the Americans, for example.

Appearance by our naval amateur and professional performers are enormously popular in all of our visits. Many Americans said that they were extremely fortunate to attend one of our concerts. But delivering performing collectives across the Atlantic, providing them with rehearsal time and with normal conditions for work, life and rest, is a sizable problem. I became persuaded from my own experience that the concert programs should be auditioned in fair weather. We shouldn't get carried away with the songs and dances of the countries we are visiting, since it takes a great deal of time to rehearse them, and the hosts are more interested in witnessing our own songs and dances. Of course, we should have a separate work-rest schedule for creative collectives sorted out before reaching port.

Given the intensity, the tightness of the schedule of functions during a visit, sometimes it happens that a large part of the personnel are able to make only one or two shore visits, and are unable to buy anything for themselves in the time available. In former times we didn't care about such things. But if we are to think about people with real respect, we must satisfy their generally modest demands. For example the selling of inexpensive souvenirs, planned on shore at our request, might completely solve the problem of the personnel spending their money.

In general, adequate attention must be provided to every element of supporting and conducting a visit. For example we always take journalists, film studio workers and photo correspondents with us aboard ship. Understandably, each of them has to write articles for his publisher. And it is the responsibility of the command to allow him to do so. Journalists usually get acquainted with the detachment collective quickly, and they provide professional assistance to the command. As a rare exception I can recall a visit to Cuba in which a representative of our military press was bent on remaining aloof of the ship organization, and pursuing more his own personal ambitions than the interests of the effort, he immediately created a conflict between himself and the detachment

command. I am referring to Captain 1st Rank V. Oppokov, who declared from the first moment of our acquaintance that he was going to write only about the shortcomings in the preparations for the visit. And that is what he did, though not on the basis of facts acquired in the course of an investigation of this issue, but on the basis of rumors.

Analyzing the results of a visit, the detachment command and the visiting staff cannot of course allow themselves to do any such thing. They are required to prepare a high quality summary of the visit, including an analysis, the conclusions, and proposals. I would like to say that in the Northern Fleet, a number of guidelines have been drawn up in the last 2 years and put to use. Representatives of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Naval General Staff and the Naval Political Directorate, and particularly captains 1st rank A. Yakovlev and Ye. Obydennikov, contributed to their preparation. But the Naval Academy's department of international marine law and its chief, Captain 1st Rank V. Smyslov, avoided providing practical assistance, even though Comrade Smyslov had himself participated in one of the visits.

Today, one of the important criteria by which navies, ships and seamen are assessed is their attitude toward ecology and their capability for maintaining the cleanliness of the sea. The cruiser "Marshal Ustinov" is perhaps the best ship of the Northern Fleet in all of these regards. This is why it was rather easy for its commander, Captain 2d Rank G. Frunze, political worker Captain 2d Rank Yu. Yurkanov, and executive officer Captain 3d Rank G. Avakyants to reply to the numerous questions from Americans pertaining to ecology and the ship.

Exchange visits conducted this year by ships of the Soviet and American navies and the results are doubtlessly contributing to a continuing system of contacts between the armed forces of the great powers.

On visiting the cruiser "Marshal Ustinov," Admiral F. Kelso, commander-in-chief of NATO joint armed forces in the Atlantic, declared: "Such visits will help us develop common approaches, which will promote reinforcement of mutual security providing for respect for and security of each country and side."

Questions on Navy's Statements on Sinking of 'Komsomolets'

90UM0174A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Dec 89 pp 2-3

[Interview with Capt 1st Rank (Res) A. N. Gorbachev by V. Yunisov: "Tragedy at High Latitudes: Eight Months Later"]

[Text] It would not make any sense to turn to the naval leadership or to repeat the commentary offered in regard to the navy's journal MORSKOY SBORNIK, in which the subject of the demise of the "Komsomolets" was

discussed by competent persons. Unfortunately their answers (MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 6, 1989) only brought up more questions. And not only in the editor's office. We came to the conclusion that the articles and the Central Television statements by A. Gorbachev raised no doubts or objections on the part of the naval leadership. On the contrary his high competency and complete objectivity are universally recognized. We will not conceal the fact that we would have wanted to interview the present submarine commander, but alas, the fear we encountered among naval officers in our search was such that it was hard to believe that this was 1989 and that we were not in the czarist court. As far as our interviewee is concerned, it was only 2 years ago that he was discharged into the reserves.

[Yunisov] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, have you read the answers given in the MORSKOY SBORNIK article?

[Gorbachev] Yes, but unfortunately, they appeared only quite recently.

[Yunisov] Why "unfortunately"?

[Gorbachev] Because this article comes nowhere near the truth in regard to the basic questions concerning the disaster, while at the same time doing everything to conceal the truth at all costs. And this opens up the door to further calamities in the navy.

[Yunisov] Then let's go on to the interview by MORSKOY SBORNIK with executives and specialists.

[Gorbachev] You read in that interview that Rear Admiral L. Belyshev, deputy chief of the navy's shipbuilding and armament directorate, said for example: "The atomic submarine 'Komsomolets' is an experimental craft." I do not agree with this.

Every newly built ship undergoes prescribed trials at the plant and at sea. State trials mark their conclusion. The "Komsomolets" underwent many months of state trials, and the corresponding document was signed, accepting the weapon system "for combat in behalf of the motherland." After this document is signed, the submarine is finally transferred by industry to the navy. Understandably if a ship fails to pass the requirements of the state trials for some reason, this becomes a headache to the contractor and the corresponding industry. When the shortcomings are corrected, the contractor once again submits the ship to the commission. Such is the procedure, and it is safeguarded by government acts and by the law itself. I won't go into the fact that these acts were often ignored in prior decades, all the more so because such a practice has finally been recognized to be criminal.

In this case the "Komsomolets" underwent all forms of trials and was accepted by the navy. As with any newly built ship, and all the more so the first in its class, in addition to carrying out its combat training missions it accumulated priceless operating experience. It was a good thing that this ship did have such a possibility

because of the favorable military and political situation of recent years. And so, the disaster involving the atomic submarine occurred during a long cruise, and it had no relationship to experimental operation. Had the disaster not occurred, no one would have thought to bring up the subject of an "experimental craft."

[Yunisov] It is still being said that the atomic submarine was built with a titanium hull, and that it was capable of submerging an entire kilometer. Is all of this really that new, and in what way was the submarine safeguarded from accidents?

[Gorbachev] The first atomic submarine with a titanium hull was accepted by the navy many years ago, and it is alive and well today. There is more than sufficient experience in using titanium in world ship building, and there is no doubt that except for a few insignificant shortcomings, this light and extremely strong material was welcomed by the building docks. On the other hand the means of safeguarding such an atomic submarine against accidents have remained at the level of previous years. Nothing new has yet been introduced to protect it against electric sparks. Any spark would mean the same fiery hell. No, as far as protection against accidents is concerned, Soviet designers have not advanced very far.

[Yunisov] We read in that same rear admiral's response that "...until the final minutes, no one (note: no one!) lost confidence that the submarine could be saved." What is such confidence based on?

[Gorbachev] My answer would be this: "God knows what this confidence is based on!"

A major fire occurred in the same area in the late 1960s aboard one of the first Soviet atomic submarines, resulting in seal failure of the pressure hull and compartment bulkheads. As a consequence the sea was able to pour through the pressure hull uncontrolled, leading to loss of surface unsinkability, and disaster. An analysis of that tragedy, in which many submariners died, showed that a major fire that is not promptly contained by the firefighting resources aboard our atomic submarines would mean certain death. It is only a matter of time: Fire in the midsection of an atomic submarine and its death agony might last more than a day, while the same hell in either of the end compartments, plus fire in an adjacent compartment, would mean the submarine's demise in just a few hours. Aboard the "Komsomolets" for example, two end compartments—the 7th and the 8th—were under the supreme power of fire by just the 7th minute.

In May I received a letter written by two students who were then in their senior year of command school and are now atomic submarine commanders. They "congratulated" me on my accurate prediction of the demise of the "Komsomolets." (Two years ago we "played out" a similar situation during an examination).

[Yunisov] Analyzing the reaction of the naval leadership and the corresponding specialists, the question that rises to the forefront is this: By what can this be explained?

[Gorbachev] Only by the fact that the navy goes to extremes. And that all that matters is how to save its so-called reputation.

[Yunisov] L. Belyshev says that the disaster has posed a number of biting questions before scientists, ship builders and naval specialists, and he assures us that measures that would preclude a repetition have been developed.

[Gorbachev] Were we to consider this bravado together with the materials of prior disasters, we would see that almost the same words have been spoken over and over again. Consider the answer given by the admiral, who knows quite well who sank this submarine: Is there even one word in his answer about the designer, the ship building industry, the military acceptance commission and, finally, his own directorate?

[Yunisov] I would like to talk briefly now about the response given by Vice Admiral V. Zub, the first deputy chief of combat training in the navy. As with other naval executives, the vice admiral also talks about the high training level of the "Komsomolets" crew.

[Gorbachev] The crew was on its first long cruise. Every submariner knows that in another two or three cruises, such a crew could excel. What do we see aboard the "Komsomolets"? The division deputy commander was aboard. The chief of the Political Department was himself aboard. A large number of flagship specialists were also aboard. Could it be that all of these people wanted to simply take a ride in the latest atomic submarine for a couple of months? No, they had all spent enough time aboard submarines to satisfy anyone! Could it be that they had nothing to do on shore? No. I feel that they went along because the crew was weak, and it had to be "beefed up."

[Yunisov] The vice admiral says in his response that a number of control measures are implemented aboard every ship preparing for independent navigation, and he offers a long list of inspections, going as far as checking the serviceability of all damage control resources, its rescue devices, and resources foreseen by the supply tables for the given class of vessel.

[Gorbachev] In the 12 years that I have served on the commander-in-chief's staff, I have persuaded myself thoroughly that just days before a ship sets off on an independent voyage, a question of enormous importance frequently remains: Do we replace some certain thing, or do we go ahead anyway, and take the risk of letting something pass once again? I am not even talking about the fact that the crews are not fully manned until the last moment, at the same time that everything should be finished not later than a month or a month and a half in advance. Moreover, it is extremely dangerous to permit such ships to sail in general, but sometimes they are

released anyway. No, what the first deputy chief of naval combat training says is the way things should be according to the documents, but there is nothing in what he says that reflects how things really are. Who tested the rescue chamber of the "Komsomolets"? Who taught the submariners to prepare and use the rescue rafts? And who trained the youngsters to find their individual protective resources in total darkness, and to never lose track of them?

[Yunisov] Let me read from Vice Admiral V. Zub's response: "Ye. Vanin's crew demonstrated a high level of training in competent and selfless actions by all personnel."

[Gorbachev] Do you personally have any doubt in the selflessness of the crew's actions?

[Yunisov] No.

[Gorbachev] I don't either. And no one doubts the self-sacrifice of the submariners. That is precisely what he is counting on: Just try doubting the competency of the crew, when it behaves so heroically, when things could easily be turned around in such a way that it sounds as if you are raising your hand against something sacred, against the memory of the dead. A cunning trick, is it not?

[Yunisov] I would call it insidious, all the more so because competent actions and self-sacrifice are not the same things. But could actions have been competent, given the level of actual combat training possessed by the crew of the "Komsomolets"?

[Gorbachev] You have asked such an important question that it immediately came to my mind that somewhere "in this world" I will meet Zhenya Vanin, and I will have to answer to him before the ultimate justice of "the other side." I don't even know how to begin without casting a shadow upon him and upon all who died. But I have to speak out. For the good of those who are still alive! I cannot remain silent at least because if I were to stay silent, I would not know how to go on living further on this earth, in the face of all of those who may perish tomorrow, due to my silence....

Can there be any talk in general as to competent actions by the crew, if the first minute of fire destroyed one of seven compartments of the atomic submarine, and two were destroyed by the 7th minute, understandably with every living thing that was in these compartments? Several minutes later fires broke out in the 5th, 4th and 3d compartments as well, and the submariners began losing consciousness due to combustion products in all of the remaining five compartments, including in the 1st, the 2d and at the main command post. Because it was impossible to remain in the area, not to mention carrying on some sort of organized struggle for the life of the atomic submarine, the 5th and 4th compartments were abandoned by the personnel soon after. The crew then found itself on a tiny "island," covered by a lethal concentration of toxic gases.

Following the disaster of the submarine in the late 1960s in the Northern Fleet, training in actions to be taken in response to a major fire aboard an atomic submarine was organized for submarine main command post personnel jointly, as far as I know, with the senior classes of command school and even the academy. These training sessions were honed to perfection, it seems to me, the "valuable" experience of other fires was accounted for, and most importantly, a system of shipboard training was developed in atomic submarine formations which the present naval commander-in-chief commanded in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There was normally strict control over implementation of this training system in submarine damage control practice. The main command post underwent training with a simulated major fire in one of the compartments unfailingly once a week. And who would have dared not to, when V. Chernavin was not only respected but also feared by the father-figure commanders, not to mention the executive officers? Soon after Chernavin left for higher positions, I became commander of a missile-carrying submarine, and a little while later my crew earned the right to compete for the title of best naval atomic submarine in damage control. We won second place that time, immediately behind the initiator of the socialist competition in the navy. I recall how the senior officer of the commission that oversaw the competition delighted in the training carried on by the main command post, and in the system established in the formation. Of course, he said right then that the command section was the weak link in the training. That same evening I was summoned by the division deputy commander for the electromechanical department, who asked me to think about the "weak link" in main command post training. I worked long and hard on my assignment, and soon after, a new variant of the training was approved and sent to Moscow itself.

A major fire in the end compartment of the "Komsomolets" became a fact at 1103 hours. The sensors indicated a high temperature, the resistance of insulation on the main power network dropped dramatically, the bulkhead between the 7th and 6th compartments grew red-hot, and black smoke filtered into the 6th compartment through a number of openings.... Had damage control training in regard to a major fire been introduced, and had things which were already known and which would have minimized the debilitating shock that afflicted the command and the entire crew, by as early as 1104-1105 hours the atomic submarine would already have been on the surface, transmitting an SOS. At this time, or a minute later, the reactor would have been shut down, because the power network had been put out of commission by the fire in the aft compartments of the atomic submarine, and because now the reactor of the "Komsomolets" was no longer needed, in the same that its main power networks were no longer useful, since they were already breaking down in response to the merciless laws of electricity.

Someone might say: "Had competent training been carried out, and had the corresponding training system

been organized, the atomic submarine might have been saved." No, I have full grounds for believing that the atomic submarine would have sunk, but without the sacrifices on the water, without the extreme situation which was created in all compartments without exception, which itself was also responsible for human losses. And remembering my "meeting" with Zhenya Vanin, you could put me to death if you like, but I will never make a training example out of the actual situation in which the "Komsomolets" found itself.

[Yunisov] But we also have an entire naval emergency rescue service, don't we?

[Gorbachev] What are you saying?! There is the persistent opinion in the navy that this service is nonexistent, because it has no effect on the fate of a ship. In any case, I don't know of a single commander who takes the emergency rescue service seriously. Moreover how can any answers be given to what the deputy chief of the naval emergency rescue service said, when there is something untrue in every sentence? Is it really possible to give such free and easy answers about the killer-chamber, and about the other rescue resources, which dumped the bulk of the crew back into the cold water within an hour? Can the chief engineer of the naval emergency rescue service assess the condition of the mortally wounded atomic submarine in this way? Where were the rescue resources that were supposed to be standing by for an emergency? Doesn't the absence of individual rescue resources say something about the naval emergency rescue service, and about the almost nonexistent preparation of the warship's crew for their use in a critical time?!

[Yunisov] That leaves us with the response given by the physician.

[Gorbachev] I know a number of cases in which naval physicians have rescued "unusable" officers from mental hospitals, and therefore I am grateful to them: Their conscience is clear this time as well.

[Yunisov] The MORSKOY SBORNIK article gives a table of distances to the accident site and the time it would have taken vessels to reach the "Komsomolets," and we find for example that the tender "A. Khlobystov" would have reached the atomic submarine by 1659 hours, 9 minutes before the "Komsomolets" sank. Is it true that the tender was late because the Sevryba Administration haggled with the headquarters of the Northern Fleet over payment for the rescue operation?

[Gorbachev] The very next day I received a telephone call from the admiral in charge at naval General Headquarters, who said that "haggling" had occurred between the Northern Fleet and the Sevryba Administration over payment for the rescue operation, and that this delayed the vessel by almost 2 hours. A few days later this version was confirmed by other officers. They were right there in the Northern Fleet's headquarters on the day of the "Komsomolets" disaster.

[Yunisov] Could you name these officers or the admiral?

[Gorbachev] Are you asking me if I am prepared to commit a shameful act?

[Yunisov] No, I wouldn't want to put it that way.

[Gorbachev] In early May I telephoned the secretariat of the commander-in-chief with a message to Admiral of the Navy V. Chernavin concerning the circumstances of the delay of the "A. Khlobystov," and I asked to be allowed to acquaint myself with the corresponding materials. I was respectfully refused access to the materials, which contained nothing that was even slightly secret. My telephone call was probably a mistake, because another version had surfaced in the state commission. According to this version, it took only about 15 minutes for the Northern Fleet and Sevryba to reach agreement. The rest of the time was taken up by the tender, which insisted on raising some sort of device from the water. While admitting that under extreme conditions the device could have been left in the water, the actions of the vessel were justified by the fact that the information concerning the atomic submarine's accident did not imply the presence of any danger.

Need I say that neither the first nor the second version makes it any easier for the relatives and friends? Everyone now knows that it was precisely in the last 15-20 minutes that the majority of the seamen died from hypothermia, and that each lost minute of time cost human lives. And an answer must be sought out for each of these lives.

[Yunisov] This is something an investigation could easily prove, because it is impossible to cover up the haggling or any other reason.

[Gorbachev] If such an investigation does occur, and it will occur, I agree that it would be impossible to cover up either version.

[Yunisov] Given all of this, is it possible that the navy was at fault?

[Gorbachev] What does the navy have to do with this? It wasn't the navy that was responsible for the extortion.

[Yunisov] Does that mean that the tender "A. Khlobystov" might have reached the submarine an hour before disaster struck?

[Gorbachev] If all of this is confirmed, the tender could have reached the atomic submarine even earlier. And no one would have even gotten their feet wet. But I still suggest that we shouldn't engage in mutual reproaches. It would be better for the investigation to take its course.

Black Sea Fleet: Problem Of Ship-To-Shore Communications

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20 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by FLAG RODINY correspondent Captain Second Rank N. Gormalev and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Pasyakin: "Once More On A Radio Link For Personal Messages"]

[Text] Black Sea Fleet—The following incident occurred at a Mediterranean port where the large antisubmarine ship Skoryy was making a call on official business. The crew received its mail. One of the sailors received an alarming letter—his mother had fallen gravely ill. The seamen was beside himself—for the letter was almost a month old. What the situation at home now?

Captain Third Rank V. Sviridenko proposed a solution—to arrange for the sailor to call home via radio telephone. The capability to do so existed. A Soviet steamship was in the port at the time. Its captain was asked to help. The captain agreed, of course, but on seeing the Skoryy's impressive radio antennas, he expressed bewilderment:

"But with the kind of antennas you have, you could communicate with another galaxy."

In response the seamen only shrugged their shoulders—they were not authorized to use their facilities.

Any seamen will tell you that separation from his loved ones is hardest to endure on a long cruise. And for this reason, efficient and reliable communications with home and family is no luxury or whimsy for a ship's crew, who do not see shore for months at a time, but an objective necessity. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has received numerous letters concerning the need to set up a ship-to-shore radio link to allow sailors to communicate with home.

The Black Sea Fleet attempted to solve this longstanding problem on its own. But the whole effort was stymied by bans and prohibitions issued by superior agencies.

For example, Captain Second Rank V. Bukhanovskiy, a Black Sea Fleet political officer, said that repeated appeals to the Navy Political Directorate regarding this matter were long unavailing.

"The technical capability to transmit personal radio telephone conversations between ship crews and shore is in place," asserted Colonel N. Mityanin, deputy chief of fleet communications. "We have the necessary equipment, and setting up a self-contained [vynosnoy] communications post on the ship to transmit the messages presents no difficulty. Moreover, we have already looked for practical approaches to solving this problem. Setting up our own on-shore dispatcher service for private messages is too expensive, for it would entail additional personnel. But it would be quite possible for us to use the

on-shore communications of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet and the Ministry of the Fish Industry. And incidentally, we have already held negotiations with the appropriate telecommunications centers in two cities and obtained their agreement. Nor is it hard to arrange to monitor message content. This function could easily be performed by a political officer, the senior watch officer, the officer in charge of the communications command department, or some other senior officer. Nor does organizing the way such messages would be paid for present any difficulty. The entire matter hinges on getting the permission of the Navy Main Staff to transmit such messages. And this is the stumbling block."

Not very long ago, the Chief of the Navy Main Staff, the Chief of the Navy Political Directorate and member of the Military Council, and the Chief of Naval Communications received another telegram bearing the signatures of the Black Sea Fleet Chief of Staff, Chief of Political Directorate, and Chief of Communications:

"For a long time, we have received numerous requests from ship personnel and crews of combat duty [boyevaya sluzhba] vessels for a solution to the problem of setting up a radio telephone link via which officers, warrant officers, workers [rabochiye], and civilian employees [sluzhashchiye] could communicate with members of their families. Similiar requests, petitions, and complaints were received during the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and during the report and election campaign in party and Communist Youth League organizations. This matter has also been raised repeatedly at assemblies of officers and assemblies of servicemen. Knowing that the problem of ship-to-shore communications also confronts the ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet and the Ministry of the Fish Industry, personnel express bewilderment—and in some instances, outright indignation—that the use of such communications is prohibited.

The lack of systematic communication with their families and the limited possibilities for transmitting personal messages have a negative impact on the political and psychological state of personnel on combat duty, spawn numerous complaints to higher-level party and Soviet agencies, and provide grounds for critical articles in the mass media. This matter is transcending the sphere of living and working conditions and becoming, amid glasnost and democratization, a political question.

In informing you of this, we ask that the ban on the use of commercial radio telephones by naval ships and vessels from areas of combat service be lifted; that efforts be made to organize the transmission of radio telephone messages for naval ships and vessels; and that, given a positive resolution of this question, that ship and vessel commanding officers be charged with supervising the transmission of such messages."

We have had ample opportunity to be convinced that the method of categorical bans has become obsolete. And it is perfectly clear today that resorting to it in instances in

which life demands that a given problem be solved is tantamount to driving that problem underground.

From the Editors. As this article was being prepared for publication, it was learned that the letter from the Black Sea Fleet to the Chief of the Navy Main Staff, the Chief of the Navy Political Directorate, and the Chief of Naval Communications had been reviewed and that the question of setting up the transmission of private messages via radio telephone between ship crews on combat duty and their relatives and loved ones will be resolved. This was reported by Captain Second Rank N. Laptev, deputy

chief of a Navy Political Directorate department, and Captain First Rank Z. Lyapin, deputy chief of Black Sea fleet communications.

Capt First Rank Z. Lyapin reported: "At present, the situation is this: The transmission of radio telephone messages for ship crews on combat duty is to be organized via the fleet telecommunications center. Communications are now being set up with cities and communities where fleet units are stationed. And free of charge, at the Navy's expense.

General Arutyunov Scores Civil Defense Performance in Armenian Quake Aftermath

90US0406A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
23 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with Maj Gen R. S. Arutyunov, chief of the Higher Central Courses for the Training and Improvement of Qualifications of the Civil Defense Management, by R. Ayrapetyan and G. Gevorkyan, correspondents of the Armenian Press Agency; Moscow, date not specified; first two paragraphs are *KOMMUNIST* introduction]

[Text] The lessons of Chernobyl, the lessons of Arzamas, the lessons of Armenia, the lessons of Ufa. . . . Already very often during the past years we have encountered various "lessons"—large-scale catastrophes and calamities. It goes without saying, such events occurred previously as well, only we did not know about them. Today glasnost opens up before us the sad picture of our lack of discipline, mismanagement, and irresponsibility. Do we always learn a lesson from these extraordinary events, and do we flexibly and effectively react to them? Are we able to liquidate their consequences, if we did not succeed in preventing them? Alas. . . .

What is the role of civil defense in this matter, what is being done for its development? This was the subject of a discussion of the correspondents of the Armenian Press Agency, R. Ayrapetyan and G. Gevorkyan, with the chief of the Higher Central Courses for the Training and Improvement of Qualifications of the Management of Civil Defense, Maj Gen Roman Sergeyevich Arutyunov.

[Correspondents] Comrade general, don't be offended if we begin our discussion with a question that is possibly unpleasant for you. For many, civil defense is a formal, bureaucratic organization, and the majority of people clearly do not know what it is engaged in and what its functions are. In the institutions, there are people who "are responsible" for civil defense, they sometimes demonstrate how to use gas masks, they show old, educational films, and that sort of thing. We understand that we are simplifying the thing a bit, but nevertheless.

[Arutyunov] If you think that I will now begin to energetically deny the formalism and the imperfection of the organizational structure of civil defense, you are mistaken. All of this does exist. And the population does in fact have an incorrect idea of our organization. The civil defense of the USSR is a nationwide system—it is a complex of national measures of economic, social and defense character, carried for the purpose of securing the protection of the population against possible accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters, and modern weapons. It relates to the most important functions of state, economic, military organs and projects of the national economy.

We can say without exaggeration that the role of civil defense is substantially increasing. The point is that the production projects created by man—nuclear power

stations, chemical, metallurgical, and biotechnological enterprises, oil and gas pipelines, and others, in the case of an accident at them present great danger both to man himself and to the environment. The natural disasters that take a large number of human lives and inflict an enormous amount of economic damage serve as a constant reminder.

[Correspondents] You, comrade general, were one of the first to come to Armenia during the terrible days after the earthquake. Tell us, how did the civil defense forces and means taking part in the liquidation of the natural disaster cope with the difficulties.

[Arutyunov] For the urgent realization of measures for the conduct of rescue and restoration work, a special operational group of the USSR Civil Defense was created in the city of Yerevan, as well as operational groups in Leninakan and Spitak—directly from the staff of the USSR Civil Defense. First of all, work to rescue people and to provide medical assistance to the victims, the provision of housing, food, etc., was organized. This work was carried out around the clock.

The introduction of civil defense units into the earthquake center imparted a more organized character to the rescue work. Nevertheless, the efficiency of the rescue work was not high. The reason is concealed in the weak technical equipment of heavy engineering machinery and means of small-scale mechanization of our subdivision, in their lack of means for searching for people who are alive in obstructions and specially-trained dogs, specialized rigging, etc. But in order for my fellow countrymen to know what volume of work we carried out, I would like to cite a few figures. In the zone of the disaster, 39,795 people were pulled from obstacles, of them 15,254 people were alive, 119,318 people were evacuated, including 79,750 people outside the republic. In Leninabad alone, more than 50 areas were cleared independently or jointly with other organizations for the construction of new houses, more than 11,000 prefabricated were made available to the population, 735 tons of scrap metal and 130 tons of construction tufa were collected, 540,000 cubic meters of demolished buildings were removed, and 122 kilometers of roads were cleared. Comprehensive assistance was extended to the population of the regions that suffered in the provision of water, food, and everything necessary in their life.

Incidentally, foreigners pulled out and rescued a total of 60 people. I do not at all want to play down their services. We should give their efficiency and professionalism, as well as their equipment with effective search devices, special equipment, the presence of police dogs, etc. their due.

[Correspondents] You mentioned the low efficiency of the rescue operations, the newspapers also wrote a great deal about this. Tell us, what lessons did you learn from these grim experiences in regard to the improvement of your entire system?

[Arutyunov] In the course of the work, we again became convinced that the organizational structure of the civil defense units today does not correspond to the execution of the tasks in conditions of large-scale catastrophes. In America we were as unprepared as in Chernobyl. In our view, it is necessary to fundamentally examine the role, functions, and organizational and staff structure of the non-militarized civil defense formations and troops. Our proposals—it is necessary to equip the developed civil defense forces with highly-efficient machinery, devices, and equipment with regard to their arrival in the region of catastrophes within a 24-hour period nearby regions. In the next 24-hour period, the build-up of civil defense units should be carried out with regard to the special features and character of the catastrophe. A part of these forces of constant readiness must be air-mobile, ready for operation in any regions, including abroad. In the subsequent stages, the involvement of the forces of the various ministries and departments must be carried out.

[Correspondents] And what can you say about the creation of quick-reaction subunits, whatever they would be called—rescue teams, specialized non-militarized formations, territorial formations of increased readiness, etc.?

[Arutyunov] Let us again note the fact that in Armenia the basic work of rescuing people was carried out by soldiers of the Armed Forces and by civil defense units jointly with specialists from organizations and departments of the country. But simultaneously we came to the conclusion that it is necessary for us to have rescue teams consisting of comprehensively-trained specialists and professionals, equipped with modern equipment, which could arrive in the shortest possible time at the place of the accident. Evidently, it makes sense to create special sub-units in the civil defense units and associations for the search for people in obstructions.

In our view, it is necessary to give the non-militarized civil defense units legislative [as published] status and to give the population that goes to make up these formations an economic interest.

[Correspondents] And how is the training of the civil defense leadership, the officials being conducted, what is their professional level?

[Arutyunov] It goes without saying, the civil defense leadership must be carried out by professionals, capable of assuming full responsibility and having the authority to implement the decisions adopted successfully. In our country, alas, one frequently encounters chiefs who have a vague idea of civil defense itself.

In the civil defense system we now have more than 150 courses on various levels, in which, along with leading

officials, many specialists of the national economy, who are responsible for civil defense sections of one sort or another at the local level, are being trained.

The Institute for the Improvement of Qualifications, in terms of its organizational and staff structure, must become a unified scientific-methodological center for all courses.

[Correspondents] And what do you say about glasnost in civil defense?

[Arutyunov] Many of the troubles of civil defense, its—to put it mildly—unpopularity among the people are to a significant degree connected with the unfounded secrecy of many of the measures carried out by it. For this reason, our people does not know its tasks and its obligations with respect to participation in the measures for the protection of the population and the national economy in extraordinary circumstances during peace and war time.

The concealment, from the public, of the reasons for accidents and catastrophes, the names of the persons who are to blame for their origin, the scales of damage, etc. inevitably leads to the springing up of various rumors and conjectures.

Complete glasnost is necessary. Every person must have a completely clear knowledge of the civil defense structure, in the country, in his region and project, and the tasks of civil defense and his obligations with respect to civil defense.

At a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a state commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Extraordinary Situations was set up. In its work it will base itself on the ministries, departments, and the systems that are now functioning in our country. Among them the USSR Civil Defense, whose composition includes organs, forces, and administrative stations throughout the entire territory of our state, will be of great help in the work of the commission.

[Correspondents] Comrade general, a few words about yourself.

[Arutyunov] I am from Artsakh. I completed secondary school there and enrolled in the Yerevan Polytechnical Institute. From the second course I was called into the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1958 I finished military school, and in 1966—the Military Academy imeni Frunze. I occupied a number of command and staff positions from platoon commander to deputy army commander. For 3 years already I have been in the position of chief of the All-Union Central Committee of Civil Defense.

At the present time enormous changes are taking place in civil defense, and my aim is to apply the maximum of my efforts and possibilities to this cause.

Chief, Rear Services on 1989 Changes

90UM0279A Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL
in Russian No 12, Dec 1989 pp 3-8

[Interview with General of the Army V. Arkhipov, chief of Rear Services of the Armed Forces of the USSR and USSR deputy minister of defense, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; first paragraph is TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction: "A Time of Crucial Matters". The first paragraph is an editorial introduction.]

[Text] This year was an important landmark in the life of our society, in the development of military building and in the Rear Services of the Armed Forces. General of the Army V. Arkhipov, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces of the USSR, tells our correspondent about the results of work in the year that is ending, the tasks of Rear Services organs, and the prospects for achieving these tasks.

[Correspondent] Comrade General of the Army! What sticks in your mind about the year 1989?

[Arkhipov] Its diversity. The positive results of the expanding perestroika and the new political thinking, on the one hand, are satisfying. Despite the opposition of certain circles in the West, we were able to find opportunities to withstand the policy of force. Because of the peaceful initiatives of the Soviets, a number of agreements were concluded concerning a reduction of and limitation on individual types of arms and a defensive military doctrine is being firmly established and consistently implemented.

There were also rapid changes in the internal life of the country. The transition of the economy onto the rails of a new economic mechanism is being implemented everywhere, and in many spheres of social production, priority is being given to the satisfaction of the needs and requests of the Soviet people. The expansion of democratization and glasnost and the active participation of people's elected representatives in the resolution of key questions of the economy and the policy of the Soviet state are the striking features of the passing year.

While giving proper recognition to positive achievements, at the same time we cannot shut our eyes to difficulties and problems that the country ran into during the revolutionary transformations. This also relates to the economy, where, as formerly, there are powerful relapses into the command-administrative approach. There are breakdowns in the implementation of economic reform and in public life, where, along with the positive processes of the democratization of society, there are also deviations from them, when extremists and separatists, dressed in the clothing of "champions" of perestroika, attempt to influence the feelings and attitudes of the people, and distortions are committed particularly in the sphere of interethnic relations, which inflicts grave damage on the friendship of Soviet peoples.

In my opinion, the way out of the situation that has developed can be seen rather clearly. It was indicated by the last plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet, whose decisions clearly defined the key directions of work at a critical stage of perestroika and the national policy of the party and the state under contemporary conditions. I believe that the most important event of the year was the resolution of the September plenum to advance the date of the convocation of the coming 28th CPSU Congress and hold it in October of 1990.

[Correspondent] The changes that are occurring very likely also affect the Rear Services of the Armed Forces in one way or another?

[Arkhipov] Unquestionably. We cannot fail to keep pace with life. As the connecting link between the economy and the Army, the Rear Services, in order to correspond fully to its designation, is obliged to react flexibly to reorganizations in both spheres and, proceeding from them, to modify itself efficiently.

Here are several examples. The country, as is known, has made it a policy to decentralize the economy and to grant local enterprises maximum economic independence. We have also given the green light to this trend. For the second year an experiment is being conducted on the introduction of the so-called territorial system of Rear Services support. I will talk about its advantages and shortcomings later; but what is important is the fact that we are not waiting in vain for something, but that we are keeping in step with the times.

Changes, however, are also noticeable in other aspects of Rear Services activity. As you know, a reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces is being implemented unilaterally, and the combat training of troops is being reoriented for a defensive doctrine. This, naturally, will also cause changes in the activity of Rear Services organs. Their standard organizational structures, mission, tactical operations under combat conditions, and so forth are now being reworked.

[Correspondent] This approach, apparently, also had an effect on the results of the work of the Rear Services in the year that is coming to a close?

[Arkhipov] To a certain degree, yes. We achieved positive changes in the development of the system of command and control and the organization of Rear Services support for the troops, refinement of the organizational staff structure, and the technical equipping of Rear Services organs, and methods for their employment, taking into account the defensive orientation of Soviet military doctrine. The increase in the material-technical base continued, and progressive methods of storage and issuance of supplies were aggressively introduced at depots.

Much was done to increase the combat readiness of Rear Services units and establishments and the quality of the professional training of specialists. Improvements were

observed in cadres policy and the strengthening of discipline, and democratic institutions are having more weight in the collectives by way of meetings, councils, and public commissions. The most important thing, in my view, is that in training and in political-educational work, we were able to shift the center of gravity from quantitative to qualitative considerations.

Thus, I think that the journal's readers will agree with me: the signs of perestroika in the organs of the Rear Services are visible and concrete. However, I do not in any way intend to overestimate what has been achieved. Moreover, as it seems to me, in a number of aspects of the Rear Services, problems have become more critical and resolving them is becoming more and more difficult. Of course, there are many reasons for this. To a certain extent movement forward is impeded by the economic difficulties the country is undergoing and by the organizational measures that are being conducted in connection with the reduction. Other objective costs are also having an effect. And still, it is my firm conviction that they are not the original cause of many negative phenomena, which we still have not been able to get rid of. The subjective factor continues to play a big role in their emergence.

[Correspondent] You have in mind the "braking mechanism" about which so much is being said and written recently?

[Arkhipov] It, first and foremost—and this is what is disturbing—it emerges frequently not by virtue of some kind of deep processes that are not visible to the eye, but there where a task is not approached with the necessary responsibility, where laziness and passivity are displayed, and where personal interests are placed above service interests. As a result, the very same mistakes in training and education of personnel are continued year in and year out, and the introduction of leading experience is held back.

Take, for example, the primary question: strengthening the combat readiness of the Rear Services. Despite the measures being taken, a number of places have not yet raised combat readiness to the level of current requirements. In the Turkestan Military District and in the Northern Fleet, the rear material-technical base is being improved slowly, control over the condition of supplies that assure combat readiness has been weakened, and large amounts of materiel are stored in open areas and are not serviced in a timely manner. I do not think that it is necessary to explain what consequences this has. However, such a state of affairs apparently does not trouble some of the managers very much. The justification is always the same: The necessary means were not allocated, and there are no people and equipment. But is outside assistance absolutely necessary to establish elementary order?

Here, for example, is the kind of a picture inspectors saw in one of the material support battalions in the Baltic Military District. The equipment of the obmo [separate

supply battalion] was in one facility and the batteries for it, without an reserve of electrolyte, were in another facility. Flour was stored in two places and clothing in five places, each at a great distance from the other. Tell me, how, in such a situation, can there be a timely transport of supplies and mission accomplishment in the support of combat operations? Are some kind of super-human efforts needed to organize compact storage of materiel?

[Correspondent] Irresponsibility and inertia are especially noticeable in the organization of combat and specialized training.

[Arkhipov] I agree with you completely. We do not tire of repeating that the modern training material base is a guarantee of fruitful training. But how is it developing? In the same Baltic Military District, there is not one training field for the Rear Services. In the Transbaykal Military District, of the planned 18 fields, only two were established. A chronic shortage of classrooms and other training accommodations is felt everywhere. In this case, do we also wait for help from the center?

Formality and oversimplification in training is disturbing. Frequently, just one exercise is planned and always according to the eternally used stereotype; they are held irregularly, and they employ outdated methods. And this is your result: among the officers of the Rear Services today there are quite a few who have a poor knowledge of directive documents and who do not have a good understanding of the principles of modern battle and the weapons and tactical operations of the probable enemy. The matter almost ends up in a paradox. Recently in the Transbaykal Military District, a commission from the center checked on the readiness of a group of officers. It turns out that not only commanders and political officers know military economics poorly, but even specialists of the Rear Services, that is, people who participate in its organization directly. The kind of comments that can be made here...

[Correspondent] In some places it appears that irresponsibility is aggravated not just by incompetence. This, apparently, also has an effect on the real support of troops?

[Arkhipov] Of course it has an effect. Serious claims, for example, are made against the food service. There is a low quality of food organization in some units, the technology of food preparation is not observed, and there is a poor assortment of dishes.

When it becomes a question of shortcomings in the organization of nutrition, there is usually a reference to the low qualification of military cooks who are overloaded with food service duties. All of this is true, but the root of the evil is still not seen in the shortage of responsibility. As is known, the USSR Ministry of Defense has demanded a sharp increase in the quality of nourishment for the soldiers. It was clearly stipulated in his order that not only specialists of the Rear Services are

to take part in this very important task, but also commanders, political workers, and other officials. What was the reaction to this in the Central Group of Forces? In fact, there was none. Many of the leaders, including Deputy Commanders for Rear Services, simply avoided the problem of food service, not providing the necessary control over the quality of preparation and the provision of established norms for the servicemen. And it is not surprising that the inspection conducted in the Group of Forces by the Military Procuracy disclosed a whole series of serious violations in the organization of nutrition.

There are also quite a few unresolved questions in the clothing supply service; however, here also much depends on internal reserves. Here is just one example: whatever unit of the Volga-Ural Military District the commission working there visited, one could hear complaints everywhere about the lack of clothing items. It became clear that 20-40 percent of the officers and warrant officers did not receive the overcoats, topcoats, blouses, and trousers they were authorized. The situation was no better with draftees. But what about the District's Chief of the Clothing Supply Service, Lieutenant Colonel V. Zholukovskiy and his Deputy officer, A. Kuznetsov? Didn't they know the situation? They knew it well; however, they did not take effective measures to improve it in a timely manner.

[Correspondent] But, nevertheless, you will agree that it also happens that the specialists of the Rear Services themselves are not able to resolve one question or another.

[Arkhipov] No one denies this. In some places of the clothing supply service, for example, there is a serious shortage of capacity for laundering underwear or dry-cleaning uniforms. The material base for company housekeeping is developing very slowly.

The difficulties experienced by the workers of military trade can be termed nothing other than chronic. The standard periods of construction of many trade-domestic facilities are constantly being disrupted. There is not enough floor space to accommodate stores, workshops, and mess halls. As before, in the PVO [Air Defense] Forces and the Air Forces there are quite a few garrisons where the trade and mess hall enterprises are located in adapted quarters that do not meet sanitary and technical requirements.

Disproportions in the provision of personal facilities have not been eliminated. The PVO Forces, for example, lag behind the Ground Forces significantly in this category. The housing problem is critical everywhere, and many military compounds are experiencing breakdowns in heating and water supply. Briefly, there are enough problems. But, I repeat, even in such difficult circumstances, people with initiative, and who care for a cause, will seek and find a way out of a situation. And there are many examples of this.

We are also seriously troubled by costs in the medical support of personnel. Despite the fact that questions of

the protection of the health of soldiers are constantly at the center of attention of military councils, commanders, and political organs, and that measures are systematically carried out to improve preventive and diagnostic treatment work, the level of illness is not decreasing in a number of places. However, it is not possible just to blame the medical personnel for this. Many illnesses emerge because of violations of health hygiene requirements that are permitted in units: failing to adhere to the norms and rules in the organization of nutrition, disruptions in water supply and in bathing and laundry services, and poor accommodations for servicemen.

[Correspondent] What trend, nonetheless, is most disturbing?

[Arkhipov] We still are not at all able to surmount the wave of losses and thefts. Their level remains rather high; and in certain services of the Rear Services, it continues to grow. It is especially alarming that officer-managers at times encroach on government property, that is, people who are themselves called on to ensure the protection of material resources. Here are examples: In the Baltic Military District, Lieutenant Colonel Z. Albekov and Major O. Punik used their official position to steal alcohol. The Chief of the Food Service for a large unit, Major A. Popkov [Transbaykal Military District], after making arrangements with Lieutenant Colonel V. Lugankin and Warrant Officer S. Ivanov, sold milk and meat products on the side, from the depot. The total damage that was inflicted is 42,000 rubles [R].

Analysis of similar cases attests not only to the low moral qualities of the individual officers, but also to the costs of political educational work with them and the serious defects in personnel policy.

The growth in losses in large measure is also conditioned by shortcomings in the storage and inventorying of material resources. Concern is evoked by the firefighting service at Rear Services facilities. Damage from fires has increased in the Siberian Military District and in the Pacific Ocean Fleet significantly.

An important condition for assuring the reliable protection of property and stores was and remains the struggle for economy and savings. In our country, unfortunately, there is quite a lot of unused capability. It is necessary to energize efforts to economize on wheat, fuel, and clothing; to extend the time between repair for equipment; and to utilize opportunities for moral and material incentives for these purposes. In the difficult situation that arose recently on the country's railroads, great responsibility is placed on the organs of the VOSO [Military Transport]. They have to achieve a sharp reduction in the demurrage of rail cars and to ensure the uninterrupted passage of military freight.

[Correspondent] Apparently, there are also costs in the activity of control-auditing organs. It is for good reason that there is so much talk about perestroika of the system of control. Our journal also recently held a discussion on this question.

[Arkhipov] Control really needs cardinal improvement. Measures are now being developed that will be called on sharply to increase the effectiveness of the work of auditors and to ensure highly effective inspections. But nevertheless I am firmly convinced that it is not necessary to hurry to reject a structure that has not fully utilized its capabilities. In my opinion, control-auditing work is capable of bringing a positive result in its present form as well; but, unfortunately, more often than not proper attention is not given to it. Up until now, for example, the efforts of the auditing apparatus of the districts and the arms of the Armed Forces have not been properly coordinated. Many Rear Services leaders practically do not participate in inspections. Auditing materials frequently are not analyzed; effective measures are not applied in them. Auditors are frequently loaded down with work not in their area; and training with them is organized from time to time, on a formal basis. Naturally, under such conditions, control does not give the necessary return; but as a result, losses grow and thefts are not curtailed.

[Correspondent] Changes in the new year apparently will also affect other aspects of Rear Services activity?

[Arkhipov] Yes, and we hope with their help to raise the quality of work of the Rear Services organs and to resolve a number of painful problems. Naturally, paramount attention will be given to the introduction and perfection of the territorial system of Rear Services support. Great hopes are tied to it. The experiment being conducted in the Belorussian, Leningrad, and Moscow Military Districts and the Western Group of Forces is graphically convincing that the system has indisputable advantages. The established network of territorial (base) centers of support made it possible to reduce the periods of delivery of stocks to consumers, to simplify book-keeping and stocktaking, to arrange closer ties with local industrial and agricultural enterprises, and—the main consideration—to increase the responsibility of organs providing rations for full and timely support of troops assigned to them.

At the same time, we should not yield to illusions and hope that innovation will save us from all difficulties. Not everything goes smoothly. While, for example, to the specialists of the fuel service, who always have had a branch network of depots and firm ties with enterprises of the national economy, the system being introduced seemed quite appropriate, then to the clothing suppliers, who had far fewer depots, it significantly complicated their work. The establishment of base centers, moreover, exacerbated the personnel problem. It is necessary for them to find staffs; but to do this under conditions of a firmly indicated trend toward reduction, you will agree, is not easy. There is that nuance [to be considered]. Undoubtedly, a center should be managed by a independent, experienced, and mature person; but how can you find this kind of person if the authorized position of Chief of the Center is only a "Major" and, in some places, even only a "Captain."

Of course, the system has promise, and it will be introduced. But I do not think it is worthwhile accelerating things. The experiment has to be continued in order to identify all of the "pro's" and "con's" and to prepare the necessary recommendations for its expansion. Incidentally, a meeting was held recently with the leaders of the Rear Services of the aforementioned Districts, during which we analyzed how the experiment was doing, exchanged views on debateable points, and worked out measures to perfect the work of the Centers.

[Correspondent] A subject of special concern, of course, will also be the Army's contribution to the resolution of the food problem?

[Arkhipov] Of course. This question was and remains a priority for us. The work here, by the way, is endless, although positive progress was noted rather distinctly. For example, unit farms are developing quite nicely in the Moscow PVO District and in the Kiev, Baltic, and Belorussian Military Districts. Units exist there in which each person on rations receives 30 or more kg of meat. And the Rear Services unit that is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Usanov for many years in succession has been providing it's own meat, milk, and eggs. But there are also cases of another kind. In the Transbaykal and Siberian Military Districts, in the Pacific Fleet and in a number of nonsubsidized enterprises there are quite favorable opportunities for the development of unit farms; however, many of them obtain only 5-7 kg of meat for each ration recipient. What is the reason? Well, the reason is in the fact that individual managers do not try to apply the necessary effort, and they do not desire to look into the importance of the task being resolved.

Conditions for the production of agricultural products in units noticeably improved recently. As you probably know, a regulation on unit farms was recently worked up and sent to the troops. Units are being allocated the needed agricultural equipment and as much feed as possible in a centralized manner. What do we have to do? First and foremost, we have to make certain that unit farms develop systematically. We have in mind that, along with the consolidation of the material-technical base, there should be an improvement in the fodder base and an improvement in the quality of products and the conditions of work in pig sties, kitchen gardens, and greenhouses. This is precisely the way the question was put recently to the collegium of the Ministry of Defense, which discussed the problem of improving the nutrition of soldiers.

It should be done in a way that arable land in military districts and fleet areas should be assigned to units and cultivated and seeded so that it will provide animal fodder and fresh vegetables and greens for the soldiers' tables. It is necessary to establish unit farms not only in all military units that have mess halls, but also in self-supporting enterprises. Collective and family contracts have to be practiced more widely in cattlebreeding complexes and in other agricultural facilities. Only in this way will it be possible to resolve the task that has

been assigned to us: for units to obtain in the next year not less than 15 kg of meat and 20 kg of greens for each person being fed, and for farms attached to economic enterprises, organizations, and establishments to obtain 15 kg of meat and 50 kg of milk for each worker and to bring their own production of potatoes to a level that covers the need for them in the troops for a period of five to six months.

[Correspondent] And what will be done to improve the living conditions of the troops?

[Arkhipov] We will have to concentrate our efforts on an all-around development of garrisons and military compounds. I want to repeat this word: "all-around." The fact is that recently the needs and requirements of officers, warrant officers, and members of their families have been lost sight of in various places. At times one gets to see this kind of a picture: a nice barracks has been built in the compound, where the soldiers are quartered according to the crew quarters system, and they have a number of the necessary communal services, and where a soldiers' mess and social service facilities are constructed according to the latest design; but the officers and warrant officers, in contrast to the soldiers and sergeants, are deprived of elementary things. There is neither housing, nor goods nor the slightest organized leisure.

This deficiency, of course, has to be eliminated. And here we have great hopes for the military construction troops. In the plans for their work, increasingly greater priority is being given to the construction of cultural and communal facilities, and especially to housing. At the same time, it is not proper for us to sit idly by. There are considerable capabilities for resolving the housing problem through construction with in-house means. There are units where this means is being used in a very substantial way, and, naturally, they get a fairly good return there. Of course, to introduce the do-it-yourself method of construction is not that easy. A shortage of money and materials has its effect, and some managers lack the initiative and developmental ability; but nevertheless, we still have to build. If we do otherwise, the billeting question will not only fail to improve, but will be exacerbated considerably.

The all-Army inspection review-competition is a good way to check on the means for improving the troops' living conditions. Its third phase is being completed this year, during which competition was initiated for the best living conditions of a garrison (military compound). Much that is positive was achieved. The principal finding, in my opinion, is that the broad circles of the Army community were also included in the campaign to develop cultural and communal facilities, along with garrison command authorities and specialists of the Rear Services. This is encouraging.

The fourth phase of the review-competitions will begin in 1990 for the best [conditions of] everyday life of a district, group of forces, army, and flotilla. In connection

with this, the tasks before us are of a larger scale; but, I think they can be managed by those for whom the socio-cultural conditions of everyday life are inseparable from combat readiness. It is only important not to overorganize a useful measure and not to neglect it.

[Correspondent] You mentioned society. Now, when the process of democratization is moving at full speed, its role undoubtedly will increase even more.

[Arkhipov] I also believe this; but this is what I would like to emphasize: inasmuch as social institutions have been granted more rights—and I have in mind, first and foremost, party and Komsomol organizations—then we can expect a corresponding return from them. However, on questions of strengthening discipline, of bringing order into collectives according to regulations, and of educational work with people, they have not yet had their weighty say. The inertia of old approaches apparently has not been surmounted everywhere, and some of the activists lack principles and an ability to properly influence attitudes in military collectives.

As everywhere, preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress are under way in party organizations and establishments of Rear Services units. During the preparation, the contribution of communists to the resolution of problems facing us will be analyzed thoroughly, and specific measures for strengthening their role in the training and education of personnel are contemplated. I sincerely hope that this will help raise the militancy of party ranks and energize their activity. We are placing great hopes on the forthcoming elections to Republic and local Soviets of People's Deputies. Under current conditions, it seems that the elected representatives of Army and Navy collectives can do much that is useful for the protection of the interests of servicemen and for the development of the cultural and communal facilities of compounds and garrisons.

[Correspondent] And in your opinion, where can we find and put additional reserves into operation?

[Arkhipov] First of all, in personnel policy. There are specific people behind each alarming case of poor discipline, incompetence, and carelessness. And many negative phenomena—I am firmly convinced of this—could be avoided if we correctly and competently implement the selection, assignment, and education of specialists of the Rear Services, including its managers as well. Let us not forget to apply Lenin's principles creatively in personnel work. In each of Rear Services collective we have to achieve a reasonable combination of experienced and junior specialists, to be concerned about the creation of a reliable reserve of managers and the timely promotion of officers with initiative and energy. We also cannot remove from consideration such an unimportant factor as social justice. It must be taken into account absolutely in the reassignment of specialists of the Rear Services and appointing them to senior positions and assigning them for training.

The strict demands on personnel must be combined with concern about officers and the protection of their interests; for it is no secret to anyone that some of the managers who do not delve into the essence of an idea are ready to blame only the Rear Services workers. Here is a recent example: In formation in which Officer A. Orlov serves, instead of preventing thefts from the depot through his own efforts, by providing reliable protection and analyzing the reasons for the losses in detail, the command took the path of indiscriminately punishing Rear Services officers. During a short period, dozens of them were submitted for discharge into the reserve as unsuitable for the positions they held. We should not pass over such outrageous cases, and we must give them the most principled assessment.

Military educational institutions of the Rear Services are called on to play a major role in effectively implementing the personnel policy. Of course, perestroika is also going on within them; but, unfortunately, we are still not receiving the necessary return from them. Academies and schools are slowly implementing reform, which calls for a radical restructuring of the training and educational process; ties with the troops are not being set up in a sufficiently productive way; and innovative methods are being inculcated with major obstacles.

However, we must augment not only the VUZ's [Higher Educational Institutions]. Everyone must aim at achieving qualitatively new and higher results in his sector. Only on this condition will we be able to fulfill the tasks that will confront us in 1990, a year of important matters and decisions.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the interview, Comrade General of the Army. On behalf of the readers of the journal, we wish you a happy New Year.

[Arkhipov] Using this occasion, I would also like to greet all the specialists of the Rear Services on the coming holiday and wish them success in their service.

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Izyumov On Need For Law On Military Enterprise Conversion

90UM0161A Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Economics A. Izyumov: "What Is Impeding Conversion: Is A Law Needed On Its Implementation?"]

[Text] A year has passed since M. S. Gorbachev announced from the UN rostrum that our country had adopted a radical program for unilateral cutbacks in its military efforts. Let us recall that the program calls for reducing the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces by 12 percent over a two-year period (1989-1990), for trimming the military budget by 14 percent, and for cutting

military production by almost 20 percent. The mechanism for implementing the program is to be conversion—the systematic transfer of military spending and military production to civilian needs.

At first glance, a good deal seems to have been accomplished in this area in the past year. Three hundred forty-five enterprises and more than 200 scientific-research design bureaus of the defense-industry complex have begun fulfilling state assignments for the development and production of civilian goods. Military warehouses are making surplus equipment and civilian supplies available for sale. Military-transport aircraft are helping to move more and more civilian cargo. In the USSR State Planning Committee, efforts to draw up a State Program for Defense Industry Conversion in 1991-1995 are nearing completion (the program is to be submitted to the government by the end of this year). When the program is completed, the percentage of civilian output in the total volume of defense complex production will have increased from 40 percent to 60 percent.

There is growing public interest in conversion. A USSR National Commission for Promoting Conversion has been set up and has gone to work. A Commission for Conversion has been created and is operating under the Soviet Peace Committee. Seminars and conferences are being held for enterprise managers, trade-union officials, scientists and military personnel. International contacts are also being expanded: On the initiative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, a representative round-table meeting was held in Moscow recently at which Soviet and foreign specialists and representatives of national and international trade-union organizations discussed problems of conversion. And the convening of a special UN conference on conversion problems is slated for June of next year.

Nevertheless, to say that conversion is proceeding successfully in our country would be to embellish the facts, in my opinion. Let us begin with the fact that it is being implemented without a clear-cut system. For most defense enterprises, the decisions on conversion were unexpected. Consequently, the assignments handed down from above for the production of civilian output have become a real headache for these enterprises' managers. Given the lack of a well-thought-out plan for conversion, these assignments very often prove to be poorly coordinated with the enterprises' "basic production" and technical capabilities. The idea of using the resources of the defense industry complex to improve the operation of the agro-industrial complex, while a good one in principle, sometimes takes strange forms, to put it mildly. What else can you say about instances in which, for example, shops that used to produce missiles are starting to make milk bottling machines, and a plant that specializes in composites receives an assignment to produce milking machines?

One could accept the lack of a clear-cut economic plan for conversion were there a mechanism in place that

would provide incentives for military enterprises to shift to civilian production. In capitalist countries, the role of such a mechanism is played by the market, as we know. When confronted with the threat of cutbacks in military orders (something the government usually announces in advance), corporations start maneuvering resources and promptly establish ties with new clients in the civilian sector. In particular, such maneuvering is currently practiced on a wide scale by many firms in the US, where as a result of cutbacks in military programs, the Pentagon has forgone the services of nearly 80,000 small and middle-sized firms in the past five years alone.

In the Soviet economy, where market relations are in a rudimentary form, such a model of "self-conversion" is simply impossible as yet. The situation of defense enterprises is further compounded by the fact that prices and profit margins for the new civilian output, as a rule, are much lower (often several times lower) than for the output being taken out of production. In such conditions, in order to maintain previous wage levels and to come up with money to reconfigure production, enterprises must either cut back the number of employees or turn to the state budget for help. The experience of enterprises that have made the most progress on the path of conversion—the Votkinsk Plant, for example—shows that, in practice, the second option is chosen most often as yet.

Since neither a plan nor economic mechanism of conversion has yet to be formulated, its implementation is effected largely through the use of the notorious command-and-pressure methods, which is to say that assignments for civilian goods are essentially imposed on enterprises. The producers' natural reaction to this is to try to bide their time or to put as little effort into the job as possible [otdelatsya maloy krovnyu].

How can we ensure that conversion brings us maximum benefit with a minimum of economic and social costs?

Soviet and international experience shows that the most important condition for effective conversion consists in involving those whom conversion affects first and foremost in its planning and implementation on a broad scale—namely the work collectives of defense complex enterprises, scientists, engineers, and trade-union officials. Nor can we leave out, needless to say, military personnel and those who support the defense sector of the economy—the taxpayers.

As was noted at the aforementioned round-table conference, this is precisely the path that labor unions for workers at certain military enterprises in the FRG, Great Britain, and Italy are taking, to one degree or another. In conjunction with scientists, and local authorities, they are setting up working groups and centers for conversion at their enterprises, as well as in regions where defense industries are concentrated.

There are instances in which initiatives "from below" have been supplemented with important legislative steps. For example, a bill on conversion that is presently

under consideration in the US Congress envisions the mandatory creation of special committees at military enterprises, the formulation of conversion plans in advance, and the creation of a special insurance fund (based on contributions from current military orders) to finance the retraining and job placement of personnel to be let go from military production. Time will tell how this will be implemented in practice.

It is quite clear that our country has a special need today for a law on conversion, a law that would spell out the responsibility of the government, military agencies, local authorities, and enterprises shifting military production to civilian output. It is noteworthy that Soviet trade unions already proposed that such a law be drafted—in 1982. At the time the proposal went unheeded, for understandable reasons. But today is just the time, it seems, for our parliamentarians from the trade unions to return to this question and to support the idea of drafting national legislation on conversion that Deputies from the Soviet Peace Committee have presented to the Supreme Soviet. The lack of such legislation not only impedes the creation of a rational conversion mechanism but also threatens the social protection of workers in the defense sector. The matter brooks no delay.

A formidable obstacle to the broad participation of workers in the businesslike discussion of conversion issues consists in insufficient glasnost on military-economic matters. Despite certain advances in the sphere of purely military glasnost, the quantity and quality of information on the defense industry in our country remains lower than in most Western countries.

I anticipate a question: Would not such glasnost undermine our security? I assure you that in the era of total electronic intelligence-gathering, the range of military-economic secrets has narrowed to such an extent that it encompasses essentially only technology and research. As for other characteristics of Soviet military industry, they have long been known to the presumed enemy. The paradox is that the employees of our defense enterprises sometimes know far less about what they make than NATO experts.

In order for workers and trade unions to take a real part in the discussion of conversion issues at their enterprises, they must have access to the information this requires. Otherwise, how can the capabilities of defense enterprises be dovetailed with the needs of their potential customers in the civilian sector if no one has a clear idea of what those capabilities are?

Meanwhile, life is forcing Soviet producers of military output themselves to work to overcome the information shortage. In Sverdlovsk, for example, a recently created regional and interdepartmental center known as Ural-Conversion is already setting up its own data bank. In Moscow, defense enterprises are setting up an export association to sell their output on foreign markets. It is clear that such initiatives deserve to be emulated.

The lack of proper glasnost in questions of military production also hurts conversion in a broader sense, since our taxpayers—you and I, in other words—still have no way of judging either amounts of military aid and the sale of weapons abroad or the expediency of various military programs.

Here's a graphic example. Recently we were informed of the launching in Nikolayev of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Tbilisi. In the United States, each such ship (without escort) costs at least \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion. Many experts, including Soviet experts, have great doubts about the degree to which the construction of a new series of aircraft-carrying ships is in keeping with the principles of reasonable sufficiency in defense and the new thinking in foreign policy. As an economist, however, I personally ask myself a different question: Does it make sense in principle to spend today such gigantic sums of money to repulse a highly unlikely external threat at a time when real internal threats—economic disorders, growing crime, and so forth—are truly mounting not by the day but by the hour? Wouldn't it be better for us to use the money gained from more resolute economizing on tanks and aircraft carriers to give pay increases to our militia, for example, and to enhance their wretched equipment? It seems to me that this would raise the level of Soviet citizens' security more than yet another addition to our military arsenal.

As we see, conversion encompasses virtually all aspects of our life—from the economy to foreign policy. Accordingly, its success can be ensured only by the concerted effort of our entire society. Today, workers and labor unions, especially in the defense branches of the economy, must more actively join in the discussion and resolution of conversion problems at all levels—including the national level, establish international contacts, and borrow from the experience of their colleagues in other countries.

Commentary on Effects of Conversion on Defense Industry

*90UM0168A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Dec 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Lukashevich, Lt Col V. Kosarev and Capt 3d Rank B. Urban: "The Economy: Will Recovery Set In?"]

[Text] It is common knowledge today that our economy is ill. One need not be a great expert to see that. It would be sufficient to go into any store, and let the shelves "shout" it all out. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to support the ruble—it has become light as a feather. And not only in the world market.

"How much longer?" is the sacramental question that gives us no rest today. Is it really true that changes will not set in even in the sixth or in the seventh year of perestroika? Who can answer these questions for the

people in general and for each person individually, if not the Congress of People's Deputies—the supreme organ of power in the country?

The government report "Effectiveness, Consolidation, Reform—The Path to a Healthy Economy" which N. I. Ryzhkov gave on 18 December outlines ways of resolving the crisis of the national economy and the approaches by which to develop it in the forthcoming five-year plan. But we should note right away that the head of the Soviet government is not promising golden hills and manna from heaven to the society. Moreover it may be understood unambiguously from the report that the next 2 years, which are looked upon as a period of transition, will not be easy ones for us. But it is precisely in these 2 years that the fundamental turning point should occur.

The main question to which two days of the congress's work were devoted—the general meeting on Wednesday and three sections yesterday—reveals the differences in the conceptions of economic scientists, the impatience of the deputies and the old petty approaches of some persons participating in the debate. The practice of section work, which was employed for the first time at meetings of a scale such as a congress, is doubtlessly progressive, since it permits deeper penetration into the specific problems of economic development by interested and competent deputies.

However, let's return to the discussion of the report by the congress itself. Opening the debate, G. V. Novozhilov, general designer of the Moscow Machine Building Plant imeni S. V. Ilyushin, noted that our industry is playing an important role in solving difficult economic problems and in saturating the market with consumer goods. Unfortunately it is not presently working the best it can. The previous problems of material and technical support have been compounded by weakening of labor and contract discipline and by the desire of some suppliers to satisfy their social needs at the expense of higher prices and other specific demands. The deputy also spoke with concern about the progress of conversion.

In a press conference held that day by First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member Yu. D. Maslyukov and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers L. A. Voronin on the ways of resolving the national economy's crisis, a certain KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent posed this question: Will conversion of defense industry not degenerate into just another campaign—will conversion not assume the form described by general designer Novozhilov, where an aircraft plant is compelled to manufacture noodle packaging lines? Is there the danger that we will cause the collapse of our defense industry?

Responding to this question, Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov said: "I share this concern. But at the same time I must say that we have never ignored the problem, and this concern was sounded very clearly in the report

by N. I. Ryzhkov, who said that providing the army primarily with modern, high precision weapons, which are required for implementation of our defensive military doctrine from the standpoint of its sufficiency, is the first and foremost objective of the work of the defense complex. There are of course certain dislocations, certain inconsistencies. But in order to break the psychology of the defense contractor who had formerly designed, let us say, warplanes and is now compelled to manufacture that noodle packaging line, such a task would of course require time, it would require adaptation to new tasks. But at the same time I'm certain you understand that the state of the economy, as described in the report by the Council of Ministers, cannot be changed without the participation of the defense complex. And in order to change this situation, the entire country must participate. Therefore the tasks which face defense industry are much greater than those facing machine building, while those facing machine building are greater than, for example, those of fuel and power industry, and so on. These tasks sort themselves out relative to the output capacities of the sectors upon which they are imposed."

A few words were added to this by Lev Alekseyevich Voronin. "I would wish that you do not get the impression," he said, "that we do not have a conversion program. Such a program has been written. Every ministry is aware of it, and it was drawn up with regard for the unique features of every enterprise, with regard for presence of equipment, production procedures and manpower qualifications, and with regard for keeping each enterprise from losing its specialization, its qualifications."

Yu. D. Maslyukov noted also that the state conversion program will be submitted to commissions of the Supreme Soviet for examination, with regard for the level of decisions already made.

Conversion was also discussed by parliamentary correspondents of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA with First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. I. Lukyanov during a break between meetings of the congress.

"I am in favor of conducting conversion sensibly in our defense industry," he said. "I don't think electronics plants should be producing cribs. This is very important."

Of the 350 deputies who signed up on Wednesday for the debate on the government report, 15 spoke. Yesterday in section meetings another several dozen took part in the debates. The desire to express one's opinion, one's concern, to propose one's own additions to the economic program, remarks and corrections, inspires the hope that an optimum variant of our economy's development in the next 6 years will be found.

It must be said that most deputies looked at the program proposed by N. I. Ryzhkov with approval and hope. But there were speeches in which it was completely rejected as well. Take for example Deputy G. Kh. Popov, who rested on the premise that fundamental changes have not

occurred in the country's life in recent times. He declared that the congress should completely reject the approach of the Council of Ministers to the 13th Five-Year Plan as being purely administrative. In the deputy's opinion we need to think more fundamentally today.

Accredited journalists are displaying unprecedented interest in problems brought up for discussion by the second congress. Around a thousand and a half of them, including 500 foreign correspondents, are working in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses. Many Soviet republic and oblast publications and youth newspapers are represented for the first time at such a forum. A correspondent from a military district newspaper is also working at the congress—Major M. Sklar. He represents the Baltic Military District's newspaper ZA RODINA. Would it be possible for other military journalists to be accredited? Without a doubt, press center associate Ye. A. Sorokin replied to our question. It is still not too late, and we are prepared to provide assistance in this.

The work of the congress continues.

Follow-Up on Experimental Territorial Fuel Distribution System

90UM0168B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Lt Gen V. Blokhin, chief of the Central Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "In the New Supply System"]

[Text] In an article titled "If a New Approach Were Taken..." published on 30 November, our newspaper described an experiment in the Moscow Military District on conversion to a territorial system of troop fuel supply. The article raised interest among readers, who submitted a number of additional questions pertaining to this innovation. The editor's office asked Lieutenant General V. Blokhin, chief of the Central Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to answer these questions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What elicited the need for a transition to a territorial fuel supply system? What is its essence, and how does it differ from the present system?

[Blokhin] I must say right off that we began introduction of the territorial supply system not from ground zero, as we already had a certain amount of experience behind our backs. As an example a similar system has been operating successfully in the navy practically since the postwar era, when the rear organs of naval bases and fleet rear departments were created to independently provide fuel to formations assigned to them for support on a territorial basis. A decision adopted by the USSR minister of defense for stage-by-stage conversion to supplying all troops with fuel on this basis was timely in the conditions of the national economy's transition from authoritarian to economic methods of leadership. With introduction of wholesale trade in petroleum products, a third of the POL assortment is being transferred to the districts and fleets for independent ordering and sales

locally by way of territorial petroleum product supply organs, as a result of which the number of suppliers for each district is increasing dramatically.

The main essence of the new system is broad encouragement of district depots and bases and other institutions subordinated to the service to participate directly in troop fuel supply, providing them with the corresponding rights and responsibilities.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Can we discuss any kind of results of the experiment yet? Does it justify the hopes? What problems have arisen?

[Blokhin] The main result is an increase in the stability, reliability and independence of troop support both in peacetime and during transition to a war posture. The following results attest to this.

The large district fuel service apparatus is freed of a significant share of current operations associated with providing fuel and technical resources to the troops, chiefly owing to a redistribution of functional responsibilities. Owing to this, it is now able to spend more time analyzing the processes going on, to monitor them, to study future needs and mobilization efforts, and consequently to control subordinated units and institutions, and the service as a whole, in a modern way.

As far as fuel depots and bases are concerned, granting them independence in supplying troop units assigned to them makes their work more rhythmical, the planning of freight turnover more sensible and the use of storage buildings and tanks more efficient, and it provides a possibility for efficiently settling mutual accounts with suppliers and paying customers. Clogging of depots with unsalable goods is prevented.

The responsibility for troop support assigned to fuel bases and depots compels them to deeply study the needs and influence the state of the fuel services of assigned formations, units and services, to improve the supply system and to train insufficiently prepared specialists locally.

The level and effectiveness of control over accounting, accountability and lawfulness of using and safeguarding POL rise fundamentally. Episodic auditing frequently carried out at a low professional level is replaced by a system of constant blanket control.

A large number of other advantages could be named. But I would also like to mention the problems that arose in the course of the experiment which need to be solved right now. The first is the need for organizing technical communication between territorial supply centers and the formations, units and services assigned to them for supply purposes.

Second. The shortage of personnel and equipment at depots and bases converted to the territorial supply system. I think that it would be suitable to take the path

of redistributing the personnel of the units and services subordinated to the fuel service of the district (group of forces, fleet).

And third—the uncertainty of the legal status of the territorial support system and organs. We need to draw up the corresponding standards.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] When do you plan to introduce the new support system into the armed forces as a whole?

[Blokhin] The preliminary results of the experiment have already been summarized. In January 1990 we plan to conduct an expanded meeting of the scientific and technical council of the Central Directorate, at which we will summarize the final results of this work and determine the specific steps which must be taken both centrally and locally, so that the new system would go to work as soon as possible. Those districts, groups of forces and fleets which are conducting the experiment will begin operating under the conditions of the new support system by as early as 1990, while the others will begin in 1991.

Conversion at Voronezh Mechanical Factory

90UM0227E Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Dec 89 Second Edition p 1

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent A. Pyatunin: "Conversion of a 'Mailbox'"]

[Text] Not very long ago the Voronezh Mechanical Factory was referred to by the number of its "mailbox," even though to local residents what it produced was no secret. Now, however, instead of filling orders submitted from the "defense side," many of its shops have started to manufacture nonmilitary products. The first 30 high-output grinders have already been shipped to agricultural industry processing enterprises. They are designed to prepare ground meat and fish in a vacuum. Each unit, costing only two-thirds as much as an import model, will provide a savings of up to 25,000 rubles a year.

The factory's collective has completed retooling for other extremely necessary consumer goods. In the coming year, for example, plans call for producing 150,000 units of the popular Rossiyanka kitchen gas range. Factory designers, engineers, and laborers will also make our medics happy.

Food Industry Machinery from Ilyushin Plant

90UM0227D Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 10 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by V. Lagovskiy: "Macaroni and Air Buses"]

[Text] Twenty percent. That is the amount of reduction in military orders submitted to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. The figure was cited at a press conference held here yesterday. How will the resulting

available capacities be used? Will there be an increase in passenger aircraft production?

It turned out that present trends are such that there is little reason to hope for conversion to take place in aviation. MNP enterprises are increasing production of equipment destined for the light and food industry, agriculture, and medicine. For example, in Voronezh the designers of the IL-96-300 are developing a giant drier for furs, while in Ulyanovsk, where new TU-204 liners were to be manufactured, a line is being assembled to make macaroni - spaghetti.

Have the proper priorities been set up? Specialists of the aviation and civil aviation ministries have their doubts. They argue that it is 10 times more advantageous to manufacture aircraft than any other nonspecialty product that is being foisted on enterprises. There is also a stable demand for aircraft from foreign countries.

There is another danger inherent in "macaroni" conversion: It will not be long before the intellectual resources accumulated in the sector will be lost.

Conversion: T-72s Intended for 'Foreign Firm' Found

90UM0227B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent V. Udachin: "'Octopus' at the Signal: How Unsupervised Rail Shipments Were Found"]

[Text] The reader will undoubtedly be flabbergasted when he learns the facts I relate below. A well-meaning reader once wrote to a newspaper: "Facts can be described by any fool—particularly a reporter." So it is that I, a reporter with 25 years of experience, do not know how to begin to describe this happening. I could not believe that something like this can occur in our country. Krasnodar chekists showed me documents and ran a film they had made, but I still could not believe it. So I stopped what I was doing and hurried to Novorossiysk so that I could deal with this "fact" hands on; see what happened with my own eyes.

En route I recalled the latest episode of the famous Italian "Octopus." Do you remember how Commissar Cattani tracked down the international Mafia that was dealing in the sale of weapons? How police cutters caught up with the ship on the deck of which was a Mercedes carrying the lethal uranium? How the Mafiosi saw that there was no escape and dumped the Mercedes into the sea? That is what happened to "there." Well something similar occurred in our country, only in this case we must preface the description with the saying: "A smaller chimney produces less smoke." Have we not learned our lesson?

But let me go back to the beginning. In Novorossiysk the local chekists accompanied me to railroad sidings, a place where light rain was falling on the "fact" that was

of interest to me. Aha! The eye could not take in everything at once. Twelve railroad flat cars were sitting there, each one carrying something under green canvas, with a shape familiar to me since childhood. I grew up in a Urals town, which had been slapped together under the very walls of a numbered plant that produced tanks. Silhouettes of the smooth-looking 34s on flat cars that passed us every day made an impression on me that would remain the rest of my life. The twelve tanks are more powerful than the T-34, of course; they are modern, the latest 1989 version. Experts stated that the tanks were fully equipped, including instruments and radio sets. In a word, they were formidable combat-ready machines. The armament had been removed—the usual practice prior to shipping—and placed into two closed cars that were a part of the train. Carried in one of them were gun tubes carefully wrapped in cloth; in the other, the machineguns, a total of 12 tank and 12 anti-aircraft weapons, of the latest make, covered with protective grease. Also present were a container of paint, spare tracks and wheels, and antifreeze. In short, a full set of spare parts. The train also included a heated car. It carried the "guard detail."

"So what?" the reader may ask. "What is so strange about that—a train carrying tanks?" He would be right, of course. Maybe they were going somewhere to be sold. Incidentally, this could be the case judging only from the inscriptions on plates and the operating instructions, which in our T-72s are in English. That meant that the 12 tanks were also designated by the plant for export. I repeat that there is nothing unusual in that, the same as in their having been shipped from the Urals to the Novorossiysk seaport, which has experience in this kind of thing.

What is another matter is how the tank-carrying train arrived at the city at the sea; who was to be the owner; and the destination of the newest combat vehicles. I have no clear answers to these questions. I think that they will be found by the respective organs. However, my job and my conscience obligate me to ponder this along with you, the reader. Get a grip on your chair and prepare for the main part of the story.

And so, on 22 December of last year, what would arrive at the Novorossiysk Railroad Station from the Urals—judging from all the signs—but military freight. The receiving point was the Novorossiysk Maritime Port. Railway and KGB workers working in transportation quickly suspected that something was out of order. To begin with, a train carrying military freight should be accompanied by a military guard detail headed by an officer, who, with the associated "appurtenances," is obligated to surrender the freight at the destination. In this case, the tank-carrying train was accompanied by a "guard detail" of three persons—civilians—who hid themselves somewhere at the first signs of interest in them and their freight. Hence the first question: How could it be that an unguarded train carrying combat vehicles travelled across half the country without causing

alarm and without giving rise to acts associated with detention? It certainly was not a needle in a haystack.

Let us continue. What do you think was listed in the accompanying documents as the "kind of freight"? "Transportation means, miscellaneous." This is in reference to the tanks. Of course, they could have been passed off as prime movers, which they could have become as a result of conversion. In that case, why would they need the tank guns and machineguns? The weapons, in turn, were listed in the documents as—you would never guess!—"heating stove, r.r." That is, the usual small stove used in heating freight cars. This being the case, with tank guns and machineguns passed off as heating stoves, the chekists had to take action. They confiscated the documents and insisted that the train which had somehow been devoid of a guard be moved to a siding and placed under watch, although I never did see a single soldier stationed there. They summoned a representative of the military procuracy, managed to have the kray procuracy file criminal charges, and put a hold on the military freight. A group of investigators was to arrive in Krasnodar from Moscow.

Now for the biggest part of the story. It is a fact that our government sells weapons. The state—and only it—has the right to sell this kind of "goods." The state is the lawful monopolist in affairs of this kind. One can easily imagine what would happen in the weapons market if defense enterprises were granted the right to dispose of its military products independently. It is definitely no accident that the Law on State Enterprise does not apply to them. Defense and weapons are a prerogative of the country.

In our case, it turned out that the wall of the respective defense departments that possess a monopoly on the sale of weapons was breached by the NPO [scientific production association] Vzlet, or more accurately, the intermediary cooperative ANT that was set up there. This association and its cooperative had been organized for a beneficial purpose: to produce consumer goods. However, ANT was successful in obtaining from foreign trade organizations (one can only imagine how this was done) the authority to sell abroad surplus products and spare parts produced above the plan and industrial waste. If tanks are surplus and guns and machines for the tanks are spare parts, then the ANT cooperative has found an activity that is as profitable as it is—to put it mildly—immoral: selling abroad under the guise of "transportation means" and "heating stove, r.r." the latest armament.

Yes, abroad. To a firm of one of the European countries. So it was that a ship chartered by the firm was to arrive from that country. With this as the goal, farsighted cooperative members signed a contract with the Novorossiysk station "to render services related to the use of railroad cars for temporary storage of freight." And what would the destination be from the firm, which has branches in many countries, including the "hot

ones"? Who knows?! What about the nearby Transcaucasus, where passions are boiling? Could those 12 T-72s not wind up in the hands of extremists?!

Another train arrived in Novorossiysk bearing "industrial waste" bound for the same foreign firm. The waste amounted to one carload of metal scrap. The remainder consisted of 395 tons of band steel and steel plates; 950 tons of aluminum pipes, lead bars, and cast bronze; 444 tons of sawmill output; 1,379 tons of mineral fertilizer; and 453 tons of granular plastic. Knowledgeable specialists stated that all those materials are under strict allocation; they can be released only with the permission of the union government. So what is this? Selling national resources wholesale and retail? Are our fellow countrymen—I hope they are still that—of the ANT cooperative also guided by "their" principles: "money is money"? And let me ask the question: Whom does this benefit? In our country, not in "theirs."

I think that the reader has been given sufficient food for thought. The respective organs will make the necessary conclusions, which must be soon, since attempts are being made to get rid of the evidence. On 11 January a telex was received from the sending plant demanding that the tank-carrying train be returned, guaranteeing that security would be provided out of "plant resources." Yesterday—Saturday—an attempt was made to steal the train. A secret attempt to acquire the accompanying documents is under way. A domestic "octopus" has come to life, extending its sticky tentacles. I wonder how our Commissar Cattanis will respond to these offenses. There is a real battle coming up.

Impact of Conversion on Omsk Missile Engine Plant

90UM0227A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jan 90 Second Edition p 8

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Shpakov: "Top Secret!: Polet Flies High"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Glasnost can bring quite a surprise at times! All of a sudden commonly-known, reference-type facts combine with closely-guarded secrets to present your native city in a new light and endow old acquaintances with a new nature.

Operating in Omsk for almost half a century is an enterprise until recently completely closed to the press. There is a collective of many thousands—and there is none at the same time. Bound by their written promise not to divulge classified information, the people working at the enormous plant lived in their isolated little world. Some people that worked many years in the same shop were not aware of the nature of the work until the very end.

Today we can speak of things using their real names. When the war broke out, two Moscow aviation plants were evacuated to Siberia and merged into one plant.

Shortly thereafter, buildings were erected in the outskirts of Omsk, where production of high-speed bombers, supervised by A. N. Tupolev, was initiated; Yak-9 fighters were to follow. It is interesting to note that the first director of the Omsk plant was famous pilot A. Lyapidevskiy, a participant in the Chelyuskin episode and one of the first Heroes of the Soviet Union. Working as deputy chief of one of the shops was S. Korolev, the future managing designer.

In the 1970s the enterprise took on the name of the Polet Production Association. It also changed its area of specialization—from aircraft to space rockets. This constituted a radically new phase of the collective's life, which was rich in history and traditions.

In the company of association Department Chief V. Chumachenko, I walked through shops that had never been seen by a reporter. I cannot say that everything I saw struck me as being new, since some of the things had been shown a number of times on television and in newspaper and magazine photos. Nevertheless, it is one thing to look at a photograph and another to stand in front of items that previously were inaccessible.

It turned out that units such as those on display there had lifted the superpowerful Energiya booster into orbit. Those elegant, smartly-painted rockets are twins of those that carry communications and navigation satellites into space. Space equipment proper, which is packed in banks of solar batteries, is also designed and manufactured there, in Omsk.

"One of the more notable developments is the international system Cospas-Sarsat, which was brought into being in creative collaboration with American, French, and Canadian scientists," said association Chief Designer, Doctor of Technical Sciences A. Klinyshev. "It is designed to rescue ships and aircraft in distress. Two Soviet and two American satellites track transport craft that are provided with locator beacons capable of determining the coordinates of an area in which an accident has occurred. The system, which has been operating for several years, has been instrumental in saving a number of lives. With this navigation satellite as a basis and the use of newly developed models, it is planned to create a global communications system that will be of service to geologists, railway workers, medical personnel, atomic industry workers, and others. But consider this interesting aspect."

Aleksandr Semenovich showed me a document which discussed the possibility of employing satellite systems to track railroad refrigerator cars. First Deputy Minister of Railways G. Fadeyev stated an unusual resolution: "It if were possible to complete this work in our lifetime, this would be the best kind of memorial to us."

The idea evidently bordered on the fantastic to the mind of the experienced manager, since he mentioned a highly indefinite time frame. Nevertheless, the Omsk people do not intend to drag out this task. Initial testing has already been carried out.

It is hardly necessary to point out the enormous savings that would be obtained on a country-wide basis if all perishable products shipped by rail (and, in principle, by any other carrier) could be kept under vigilant surveillance. In Polet, 1991 is cited as the year when the system will be implemented. It seems that the wait will be short.

The Siberian designers are ever more confidently dealing with international orbits. For example, they are competing in developments associated with UNESCO and looking into the organization of satellite communications for application to earthquake prediction. Only a short time ago such activities would have been looked upon as exercises offering no practical value. The situation has changed, however. There is now a powerful element at play: conversion.

"Conversion, in our understanding, is primarily the effective utilization of the accumulation of the enormous scientific, technical, and intellectual resources for promoting high humanitarian purposes," said V. Zaytsev, general director of the GPO Mashinostroitel, PO Polet, and Hero of Socialist Labor. Since conversion caught us unawares, we at first had to operate by applying local initiative. The shops were offered their choice of a product, after which unoccupied production facilities were utilized to manufacture 'a thousand little articles.' However, in the future we will become involved in more sizable matters—ones more in line with the collective's capabilities."

Strictly speaking, highly popular consumer goods have been in production there for some time. That is why the semiautomatic washing machine "Sibir-6" is rightly considered to be the best in the country: It is inexpensive, convenient to use, and reliable. No wonder that supply cannot keep up with the demand. Negotiations are being held with a large foreign firm; the purpose is to organize a joint enterprise that would manufacture automatic washing machines capable of competing on the world market.

Among the new products nearing completion at Polet is an automated line for baking 1,100 eclairs an hour. In one of the shops I was shown a model developed by Ukrainian food machinery designers and the Siberian version of the same line. The difference in quality was amazing.

"We are rocket people," smiled Assistant Shop Chief Yu. Bobkov. "We simply do not know how to do sloppy work."

The association has other orders for food industry machinery: lines for producing shortcakes and chocolate bars. Each one is capable of manufacturing one ton of confection per hour. In essence these are miniplants, and their mastery requires quite a bit of effort. All the more since there are no comparable domestic models in existence. None of this may be inspiring, but someone has to bring our long-suffering food industry out of its sleepy backwardness!

The collective's difficulties and unresolved tasks abound. Aviators would say that you must quickly vary your wing geometry while maintaining altitude. However, the extremely rich experience and high quality of production guarantee that Polet will withstand the trials presented by conversion.

May it have clear skies!

Consumer Goods from Yurginsk Machine-Building Plant

90UM0227C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Kostyukovskiy: "A Liliya for Housewives"]

[Text] Not so long ago it was forbidden even to mention what was being produced by the Yurginsk Machine-Building Plant production association.

Incidentally, that is most likely still true for some of its production. However, the main products are gradually being displaced by consumer items that bear no "secret" label whatsoever. The first lot of the small washing machine Liliya has been produced. This year, 10,000 units are to be manufactured. Production of scarce spare parts for the Zhiguli is in the process of expansion. The enterprise plans to tool for the production of complex items, such as automatically-controlled heating systems and dishwashers for the home.

Lithuanian Proposal to Reorganize DOSAAF

90UM0240A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
15 Dec 89 p 1

[Article: "DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Vilnius, 14 December (ELTA). The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF was held today in the Republic Palace of Culture of Trade Unions. The plenum's participants discussed the objectives of restructuring the activity of the republic's DOSAAF organization under present conditions.

Major General G. Taurinskas, chairman of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF, who gave the report, and speakers at the plenum noted that restructuring is proceeding too slowly in this organization, and that it is not producing positive results. The plenum's participants proposed reorganizing the DOSAAF into an organization which would satisfy the needs of the republic's residents. One of the proposals, which was supported by a majority of the Central Committee members, was to reorganize the DOSAAF into the Lithuanian Sports-Technical Union (STSL).

The plenum decided to open up reform of the society's activity, its status, its name, its national symbol and the forms and methods of its work to broad discussion.

Syrian Defense Minister Defends Dissertation At Soviet Military Institute

90UM0185A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Dec 89 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed article: "Interest In Soviet Marshal"]

[Text] At the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History, Corps General Mustafa Tlas, minister of defense of the Syrian Arab Republic, has defended his dissertation for the academic rank of doctor of history. The work, which was entitled "The Military Thought of Marshal G. K. Zhukov"—Colonel General D. A. Volkogonov, doctor of philosophy and director of the institute, served as research consultant—was, by general admission, of high scholarly quality.

The session of the institute council was attended by SAR Ambassador to the USSR Issam El Naib, prominent military historians and specialists of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of USSR military academies, and the military leader's daughters, Era Georgiyevna and Ela Georgiyevna.

"The defense was of a unique nature," said Major General A. G. Khorkov, doctor of history and the Institute of Military History's deputy director for research work, commenting on the event. "Indeed, the degree candidate was a minister and doctor of military science, and, moreover, the sphere of his research interests—Zhukov's military thought—is a great rarity even for Soviet historical scholarship. It should be noted that Corps Gen Tlas has long and actively promoted Soviet military art in the Arab East."

The institute council took a decision to confer the academic rank of doctor of history on Corps Gen M. Tlas.

Interview With Chief Of Military Educational Directorate

90UM0185B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen I. Popov, Chief of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent. "New Features Of Cadet Life"]

[Text] Major General I. Popov, Chief of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense answers questions from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Ivan Porfiryevich, the editors have been inundated with letters from cadets requesting one and the same thing—that we tell about the changes awaiting them...

[Popov] The changes stem from the adoption of a new Statute on Higher Military Educational Institutions. We are aware of the interest the statute is generating. And

this interest is quite understandable: The statute does indeed make many changes in both the military educational system and the regulations governing the rights and responsibilities of students and cadets. I will try to single out the principal features.

The first thing I should say is that approaches to the way the educational process is organized are undergoing substantial changes, primarily with respect to the intensification of individualized study and the development of students' and cadets' creative abilities. The heads of higher educational institutions and departments are granted the right to draw up individualized study plans for those students and cadets in the upper-level courses who successfully master study programs and show an aptitude for scientific creativity and teaching. Students and cadets in their second and subsequent years of study who maintain grades of excellent and good are permitted to take examinations and tests early. Moreover, if a student shows excellent progress, a department head can waive altogether the requirement that he take an examination or test with evaluation and give him a grade of "excellent" based on the results of his current progress.

The role of research projects carried out under the auspices of military-science societies is enhanced. Research projects that win prizes in all-union competitions can be credited as course work, projects, or assignments, and their authors can be released from examinations or tests in the discipline in question.

We have also adopted a number of other measures aimed at moving away from rigid regimentation in education, and the educational process itself is being oriented toward a creative approach to organizing a specific individual's studies and toward the creation of conditions that stimulate the development of individual abilities and productive labor.

Innovations adopted with respect to the system for planning the training and educational process also pursue this aim. Henceforth the head of a higher educational institution has the right to redistribute time among disciplines and to reduce or increase the number of hours allotted for the study of a given discipline in an amount of up to 10 percent. Moreover, he can introduce new subjects or drop those that are irrelevant. The rights of instructors have also been significantly broadened. Now an instructor has the right to choose his own methods and means of instruction, on the basis of his own experience and individual characteristics.

And another change. Higher educational institutions are permitted to give examinations not just during the examination session but also in the course of the semester, when the study of a given discipline is concluded. The choice of form of examination, including state examination, is granted to the institution head.

I would like to speak at some length on the following circumstance. Over the past two years, a whole set of measures has been devised to enhance the interest and personal responsibility of students for the results of their

student labors. These measures include a material incentive system, which until recently was considered not quite acceptable for military higher educational institutions. Now cadets who, based on the results of the exam session, have grades of excellent, will have their base pay and allowances increased by 50 percent, and those with grades of excellent and good will receive a 25 percent increase. In addition, the institution head has the right to raise cadets' base pay and allowances for outstanding achievement in the study of individual disciplines and in research work and scientific-technical creative endeavor.

The amounts of one-time cash bonuses paid on graduation from an institution are being increased—and substantially: those who graduate with a gold medal receive two months' base pay, and those who graduate with honors receive one month's base pay. It will be recalled that these graduates also have preference in choosing their place of service.

At the same time, the new statute also provides for stricter measures with respect to those who are unwilling or unable to study successfully. The system of conditional promotion to the next year of study or semester of students and cadets who received grades of unsatisfactory in an examination session was abolished earlier. Now there is a requirement that academic deficiency must be cleared prior to the next year of study or semester. Those who fail to clear it within the established period are dismissed from the institution. Persons who fail to be cleared for examinations in three or more disciplines are also subject to dismissal.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What changes are being made with respect to the billeting of cadets' who are leaving quarters at the VUZes? It is well known that for many years these questions have been among the most sensitive for cadets and of the greatest concern to them.

[Popov] Considerable changes are being made here too. For example, mandatory assignment to barracks applies only to cadets in the first two years of study; the rest have the right to live in general housing. In general, the new regulation puts the total length of residence in the barracks at two years. Consequently, cadets who are soldiers doing compulsory service can be placed in general housing in their second and even first year of study—upon completing 24 months of active military duty. Those who have completed their term of service prior to enrolling in the school, as well as cadets who are warrant officers, midshipmen, and re-enlistees, are released from assignment to the barracks as of their first year of study.

As for leaving quarters in higher educational institutions, the regulation is now this: first- and second-year

cadets may leave only in strict accordance with the Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces. Cadets in their third and subsequent years of study, as well as cadets who live in general housing, may leave their institutions after classes and the mandatory hours of independent study for up to 24 hours, and married cadets—up to the start of classes on the next day of classes.

I should add the following here. Cadets who have the right to live in dormitories are permitted to wear civilian clothing—when off-duty, naturally, and outside the grounds of the institution. Other cadets can exercise this right only during their regular and winter leave.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Doesn't it seem to you, Ivan Porfiryevich, that for many cadets, the right they have been given to live in dormitories is of a merely declarative character? After all, by no means all schools have dormitories, and one-fifth of all cadets still sleep on bunks. Excuse us, but is there much benefit in proclaiming rights when there is no possibility of exercising them?

[Popov] The question of providing institutions with dormitories is truly one of the most pressing ones. But let us proceed from the premise that most schools do have dormitories and that, consequently, social justice will be restored for a sizable segment of cadets: the right to live in the barracks two years, and not four or more years, as has been the case up till now. Today this applies to senior cadets at schools lacking dormitories. A decision has been taken to allow married cadets in their third and subsequent years of study to live outside their institutions. The right to grant such permission is given to the heads of military educational institutions.

But what about the remaining cadets? I think that a temporary solution can be found for most of them as well. For instance, it would be possible to free some of the rooms in barracks and to remodel them as dormitories. In doing so, of course, it might be necessary to impose some forced restrictions on residency amenities. But for the time being there is simply no alternative. Let me repeat that such measures must be viewed as temporary. The problem of outfitting military educational institutions is now receiving serious attention at all levels. In the near future, it will be reviewed in the Ministry of Defense.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Will the new statute apply to cadets at secondary military educational institutions?

[Popov] No, it will not. A different statute is being drafted for those institutions, and it too envisions a whole series of changes encompassing many aspects of the cadets' lives and schooling. To all appearances, it will take effect next year.

Trends in International Arms Trade Noted

90UM0169A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Ye. Mishin: "The Arms Market: What Are Its Trends?"]

[Text] "We often hear that arms trade is one of the factors destabilizing the international situation. I would like to know who controls the 'arms market'."

Major Yu. Sosunov, Central Group of Forces

A certain decline in the rate of growth of world arms exports is now being observed. According to data of the Stockholm International Institute for World Problems Research (SIPRI), in 1988 the volume of world sales and deliveries of the principal systems of conventional arms was \$34 billion, which was \$5.5 billion less than the record figure of 1987.

However, these statistics are incomplete, inasmuch as they are not based on anywhere near the full number of deals. Direct deliveries of weapons by private firms in avoidance of state organs, black market deals, which reach major proportions, and exports of "double-purpose" goods which are registered as civilian goods but which can be used for military purposes with minimum modification remain unaccounted for. Thus the real volume of international arms trade may be a minimum of a time and a half greater than the official data.

The developed countries remain the principal exporters, supplying over 90 percent of the arms on the world market. As before, according to SIPRI's data the USA remains in first place with 84 percent of world arms exports. The Soviet Union is in second place. China comes up third, with 90 percent of its deliveries being to Arabian countries and Pakistan. France and Great Britain occupy fourth and fifth places respectively.

Practically everything except for ballistic missiles and large aircraft carriers is for sale today. Weapon systems created on the basis of the most recent technology—things which had previously been kept under lock and key by supplying countries—enjoy special demand.

Three-fourths of the arms imports are by developing countries, chiefly Near East, African and South Asian. Over 65 percent of total exported weapons reach their final destination in six countries—Iraq (which until recently spent around \$6 billion annually on arms purchases), India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria. Of course, a tendency for the proportion of Third World countries importing weapons to decrease has recently appeared in connection with the fact that their solvency has decreased due to the long-term crisis and the drop in prices on oil and other raw materials.

Gushev Commentary on U.S. F-16 Sale, Pakistani Nuclear Program

90UM0182A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Col A. Gushev: "Islamabad and Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Pakistan has been undergoing a process of rapid growth of the fighting potential of its armed forces in recent years. It is forming new formations and units which are being deployed chiefly in regions bordering with India. The Pakistani army is being armed with new armored equipment, modern artillery systems, missiles and new types of warplanes and helicopters. The number of ships in the navy is increasing. Islamabad is forcing measures to transform Pakistan into one of the militarily strongest countries not only in the region but also in the Islamic world. Efforts by Pakistani scientists and engineers to create nuclear weapons are also subordinated to this objective.

Pakistan's program to develop an "Islamic" atomic bomb was approved in earlier days by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The foundations of the corresponding scientific and technological base were laid under his tenure as well. Following the military coup of 1977 and seizure of power in the country by the military under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq, implementation of the military nuclear program in Pakistan began accelerating. Efforts in this direction are continuing under the present government as well.

According to the foreign press, Pakistan has been implementing a program since the early 1970s to develop its own nuclear ammunition, code-named "Project 706." Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Kadir Khan [transliteration] is its leader. The procedures for obtaining uranium suitable for weapons are being worked out and the industrial base for its accumulation in the required quantities is being created within the framework of this program. This is precisely why Pakistanis refuse to place most of the facilities of their atomic scientific research and industrial base under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and have not signed the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan is carrying on the bulk of the work in the area of the use of nuclear energy at the atomic scientific research center in Nelora [transliteration], in the vicinity of Rawalpindi. Essentially two research and experimental production complexes have been created here. Scientific research laboratories, a research reactor operating on uranium enriched to 90 percent, and an experimental plant producing fuel elements for the Kanupp Nuclear Power Plant, built in 1972 with Canada's assistance, all of which are under IAEA control, are operating in one of these complexes, located in the open part of the center. In the other part of the center that is closed to international control, according to the press there is a device that splits uranium isotopes by means of gas centrifuges,

an experimental radiochemical device and other facilities in which experiments with nuclear materials are carried on. The scientific research and production base of the Nelora center is constantly undergoing improvement and expansion.

The nuclear center in Kahuta, 30 km east of Rawalpindi, is an especially high-security facility having a direct relationship to Pakistan's military nuclear program. This center contains a uranium isotope fission plant at which acquisition of uranium for weapons has been organized. The principal elements of the complex in Kahuta are a huge centrifugation shop, scientific research laboratories, an electric power plant, a nuclear material storage site, and others. According to estimates by Western specialists Pakistanis have already assembled several units of nuclear ammunition on the basis of uranium produced for weapons in Kahuta.

Judging from everything, the Pakistanis are not satisfied with the rate of production of uranium for weapons, and in order to "rectify" the situation they have begun assembling equipment of greater productivity in Kahuta, and they have started building another uranium fission plant in the vicinity of Golra (10 km west of Islamabad). There are plans for using this plant's gas centrifuges, which are more modern than those in Kahuta, to obtain highly pure enriched uranium, which will make it possible to hasten conversion to assembly-line production of nuclear ammunition.

The relatively new nuclear center in Chashma also has a relationship to Pakistan's military nuclear program. A radiochemical plant extracting plutonium from spent nuclear fuel was erected there with France's assistance. Since the Pakistanis broke their contract with the French in the mid-1970s, they have been actively seeking a new supplier of equipment for this plant. The Kanupp Nuclear Power Plant may be the source of irradiated fuel for it.

Implementation of Pakistan's nuclear program is supported by presence of uranium ore deposits in the country, estimated at 20,000 tons. Uranium ore is being mined at uranium mines in the vicinity of Dera Ghazi Khan. A uranium enriching factory with an annual output of 200 tons of uranium concentrate, built with the FRG's assistance, is located here as well. According to estimates by foreign specialists, were this quantity of crude uranium to be processed further, enough uranium of weapon purity could be obtained for 16-24 nuclear charges with an average yield of 20 kilotons.

It should be emphasized that Pakistan's own explored deposits of uranium ore are clearly insufficient for its nuclear program. This is why Pakistanis are actively seeking sources from which to obtain crude uranium abroad. The so-called "Special Projects Organization" was created in order to purchase materials, raw materials and equipment needed by Pakistan's atomic industry.

"They're not worth the paper they're written on" was the expression used by U.S. Congressman S. Solarz,

chairman of the Subcommittee for Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee, to describe assurances by the Pakistani government that the country is not involved in development of an atomic bomb. The only debate on this issue concerns the quantity and types of nuclear ammunition possessed by Pakistan. For example in a discussion in the U.S. Congress of problems associated with providing American military and economic aid to Pakistan, American senators J. Glenn and A. Cranston presented information at their disposal on Pakistan's capacity for assembling several units of nuclear ammunition each year.

Confirmation of the fact that Islamabad was involved in development of nuclear ammunition in the 1980s can be found in detective stories, of sorts, which have acquired rather wide notoriety and which concern themselves with the detention and exposure of a number of Pakistani agents in Western countries attempting to purchase and send technological secrets and special materials and instruments, used in the production of nuclear ammunition, to Pakistan. The most recent examples of this sort are stories of Pakistan's attempts to illegally acquire, in the USA and in some Western European countries, crytrons—high-speed electronic switches suitable for use in nuclear charged detonators, and special, ultrahigh-strength steel used to make the housings of nuclear devices.

Mention should also be made of the fact that Pakistan has completed development of its own tactical and operational-tactical missiles with ranges of 80 and 800 km respectively. Proving ground tests of these missiles, which were named Khatf-1 and Khatf-2 [transliteration], were carried out in early 1989. The advent of these missiles in Pakistan's arsenal may be evaluated as one of the final steps in formation of its nuclear potential. Pakistan could use F-16 fighter-bombers, also obtained from the USA, as the delivery systems for the nuclear weapons.

The example of Pakistan shows how the short-sighted, conniving policy of countries possessing nuclear weapon technology toward states attempting to acquire nuclear weapons endangers strategic stability and peace in the modern era.

Golts Critique of U.S. Intervention in Panama

90UM0198A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Golts under rubric "A Columnist's View": "Panama: What the Rangers Are Shooting"]

[Text] Ten days ago the U.S. weekly AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reported that the Pentagon was testing a new supercomputer system intended for processing all that colossal volume of data which will come to the military department in case "a crisis situation breaks out" in any area of the globe. Such an analysis is required to ensure effective actions of U.S. Armed Forces.

At that time the world press was continuing to discuss results of the Soviet-American meeting off the shores of Malta, and I still had the thought then that perhaps for the first time, progress in the area of political thinking had begun to clearly outdistance scientific-technical thinking. In fact, the statements of both leaders about the need to respect sovereign rights and freedom of choice of each people and state inspired hope that a category such as "military intervention" would pass into oblivion. Consequently it was thought that the Pentagon's computer was doomed to stand idle and would become one more monument to the inglorious times of imperial claims and confrontations.

But today computers in the U.S. military department probably are overheating from overtime work: the aggression in Panama is in full swing.

According to the U.S. press, the action against Panama is the largest combat operation by U.S. Armed Forces since the intervention in Vietnam. It is following a scenario rehearsed long ago: while 82d Division airborne personnel are neutralizing centers of resistance and special teams of Green Berets and CIA associates are attempting to capture General Noriega, a "president" suitable to Washington already has been sworn in at a U.S. military base in the Canal Zone.

And the set of excuses for the brigandage also is from the arsenal of imperial politics which appeared to already have become a thing of yesterday.

I even admit that the U.S. president was in fact disturbed that an American officer had been killed. I also admit that it appeared to the proprietor of the White House that the lives of other Americans were threatened. But the military aircraft were not used for emergency evacuation; they were used for bombing the Panamanian capital.

Today we live in a swiftly changing world, a world which not only inspires hopes, but also casts challenges. In my view, the U.S. operation in Panama posed the question point-blank, as the saying goes: "How should a civilized country react to particular challenges thrown it by the evolving foreign political situation?" Under present-day conditions do the duties of a great power include teaching others how to live and demanding that they follow a particular system of values?

I will say honestly that for a long time we ourselves did not give an unequivocal answer to this question. Now we have. We have, after experiencing the pain and bitterness of Afghanistan. We have, after fundamentally assessing the commitment of troops to Czechoslovakia in 1968. We decisively rejected the concept which the West calls the "Brezhnev doctrine."

The Soviet Union is demonstrating both in word and deed respect for total sovereignty of Eastern European countries unrestricted by ideology. We respect their striving for independence without excluding possible

transformations of socioeconomic and political institutions. But by acting in this way we have the right to demand the very same of others as well. Speaking of the approach to the situation on the European continent, it must be said that the West, including the United States, is trying to follow its own calls for restraint.

But when the talk turns to the developing countries, Washington as well as its NATO allies (some of them supported the aggression) apply quite different yardsticks. It seems that the U.S. capital just cannot reject neoglobalism, the doctrine which required that notorious "vital interests" be ensured by direct intervention, including military, throughout the world.

This is why the support, including arms deliveries, continues for antigovernment units in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola. This is why Washington does not wish to leave Nicaragua in peace in any way. This is why it crept into Panama.

On the day after the beginning of the intervention that same NEW YORK TIMES wrote: "For Bush the U.S. invasion of Panama was not only an attempt to achieve specific objectives, but also the rites of initiation into the presidency. The majority of U.S. leaders since the time of World War II... have acted on the basis of confidence that American political culture demands that they immediately demonstrate to the world that they have big sticks."

And so the big stick has been demonstrated. No one will dare call the president "indecisive" any longer. Even if we do not take the moral aspect of the matter into account, however, I am sure that when people begin to count up the purely political pros and cons it will become obvious that the U.S. action did much more harm than good to U.S. policy. Figuratively speaking, U.S. soldiers are shooting not only at Panamanians, they are shooting at a very delicate fabric of trust in interstate relations barely beginning to form in the world arena.

One other conclusion from the events in Panama. Judging from everything, we still have far to go to a universally civilized era. It follows that our country must have such Armed Forces that would be a reliable guarantee of security in case of any, even an unpredictable, situation. In my opinion the U.S. intervention must force those people to think who today at times demand from high rostrums an almost complete unilateral disarmament.

Reader Asks About Cuban Troop Deployments

90UM0198B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 89
Second Edition p 4

[Article by A. Sharyy in response to letter by Ya. B. Ablyakimov: "A Shield Against Threat"]

[Text] I know from mass media reports that a withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent from Angola is going on. Tell us how many Cuban soldiers already have returned

home, in what countries were Cuban soldiers located previously and are located now, and on what basis.

Ya. B. Ablyakimov, Fergana

At the request of the governments of Syria, Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and a number of other countries, Cuba sent its military contingents there in various years to participate in combat actions. "We are not sending our volunteers to take part in civil war," declared Cuba's leader Fidel Castro on this account, "inasmuch as we believe that the internal affairs of any country are not objects for military intervention; our presence represents a shield against invasion or threat of invasion from without."

At the present time withdrawal of the 50,000-strong Cuban military contingent from Angola continues. Some

27,000 officers and men had returned home by the beginning of December of this year. The last Cuban soldier will leave the territory of Angola by 1 July 1991.

There has been a Cuban military contingent in Ethiopia since April 1977. There were 2,094 volunteers in Ethiopia as of the beginning of this fall. Their withdrawal began in September of this year under a bilateral agreement.

There is a small Cuban military contingent in the Congo.

Over the past three decades more than 400,000 Cuban military and civilian specialists have been on the territory of Africa. According to Cuban information, 2,289 persons have perished or have died from tropical illnesses.

Airborne Division Commander on Entry into Afghanistan

90UM0225A Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No 23, 1989, pp 6-8

[Interview with Airborne Division Commander Major General I. Ryabchenko, by SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Cherkasov, on the 10th anniversary of the Soviet entry into Afghanistan; place of interview not given; first paragraph is SOVETSKIY VOIN introduction]

[Text] At the present time, the 10th anniversary of the insertion of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, there is no end to appeals for telling the entire truth about the painful and protracted war that has remained unknown to our people for a long time. Has not everything been told? What do you—a participant in the events that took place in December of 1979—think about the numerous articles that have appeared on the eve of the anniversary that does not call for a celebration? These questions were put by our correspondent to Major General I. Ryabchenko, former commander of an airborne division that was the first to enter Afghanistan.

[Ryabchenko] I automatically consider each article on the basis of what is said about the true reasons for the troop entry and the kind of explanation offered of the particular tasks facing us at the time we were preparing to take action. Within this framework, I have not yet seen anything of sufficient merit. What we have are all kinds of guesses, conjecture, stories, and statements made by individuals "within the bounds of available information," but very little of that which actually did happen, especially within the context of our viewpoints and feeling on the events concerning Afghanistan of 1978-1979. At the present time it is easy to condemn everything and say that the sending of troops was a crime, etc. However, simple judgements do nothing to shed light on the political and military situation that existed in that area just before the decision was made. I feel that to some extent the decision can be justified from a strategic standpoint: We wanted to secure a highly important portion of our southern border, all the more since the Afghan government made numerous requests for entry by Soviet troops—and that is a reality.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Incidentally, the General Staff has already declassified many documents of that time. For example, here is an excerpt from a report submitted by L. Gorelov, the chief military adviser in Afghanistan, to Army General I. Pavlovskiy. On 12 August 1979 he wrote: "... Spoke with H. Amin at his request. Of particular interest during the conversation was the request that Soviet subunits be sent to the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]... He further said that 'It is possible that Soviet leaders are concerned that adversaries in the world would see this as interference in the internal affairs of the DRA. However, I assure you that we are a sovereign and independent state; we resolve

all problems on our own... Your troops will not participate in combat activities. They will be used only at a time that is critical for us. I believe that we will need Soviet subunits before spring arrives.'"

[Ryabchenko] Note the phrase "will not participate in combat activities." I later also heard this kind of request made by Jakub, the general staff chief of the Afghan Armed Forces. He requested that we station troops at the Afghan-Pakistani border; cut off the passes, roads, and caravan routes to deny the counterrevolutionary forces the opportunity of receiving external assistance. I am convinced (I made my feelings known even then) that had we indeed secured the border, had we not stationed our troops in the provinces, where we permitted ourselves to be drawn into combat, much would have been more favorable for us. At first the entire Afghan nation took our arrival as a proper step. On the morning of 27 December they showered us with flowers. We had no doubts about the sincerity of the feelings displayed by simple Afghans at that time. Yes, to them we were heterodox and alien... However, they saw in us a force that was capable of ending the war. I can say that as an eyewitness.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] However, today we are forced to deal with the past, not the possible. In this connection, the events that occurred on the first day are shrouded in incompleteness, allusions, and highly contradictory accounts. What actually did happen?

[Ryabchenko] To call a spade a spade, there was a revolt. Amin was removed and Babrak Karmal was installed in his place. The new government had been formed previously. Suslov personally saw to that. Here is where I feel that a most serious error was committed. It turned out that we were denying the Afghans the exercise of initiative at all levels. And they were happy to surrender it to us, reasoning that since we were there, we should act, decide, and wage war: we were stronger.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Does this mean that you can be considered to have been a participant in the revolt?

[Ryabchenko] Not quite.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Let us discuss the military aspect of the operation. At that time, the end of the 1970s, the press made passing references to "quick reaction forces" and "rapid deployment forces." They pertained mainly to special units of American troops. However, we also had troops that were capable of quickly reacting to the most extreme situations. In fact, you commanded such a unit: an airborne division. It is understandable that, for you and your subordinates, an unexpected combat mission is something you take in your stride. Be that as it may, just how unexpected was Afghanistan?

[Ryabchenko] It came to me as a surprise, of course. This was because the division was studying another probable enemy. We had to retrain. Later, however, when I analyzed the events of the last year, it came to me that our division had been the object of attention. I recall that

on a holiday, Constitution Day, one of the division's regiments was unexpectedly—even for the leadership of the Airborne Forces—ordered to commence training in the Turkestan Military District.

I was assigned the mission proper in September of 1979. It was written in mild language: This is not to be an invasion or an occupation; we are to render assistance to friendly Afghanistan in the struggle against the counter-revolution. For this reason, it is necessary to cut off the flow of weapons, ammunition, and equipment from Pakistan and Iran.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] It was not possible to accomplish the task without possessing a knowledge of the situation in that area. Had you spent some time in Afghanistan prior to December of 1979?

[Ryabchenko] I had. I and a small group of officers flew to Kabul. I studied the situation, became familiar with the terrain where the division was to make the landing, and in general had an opportunity to evaluate the area of the forthcoming combat activities.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] How accurate was the information in your possession at that time?

[Ryabchenko] Speaking of the data on disposition of government troops, I had no doubts. Concerning the figures on counterrevolutionary forces concentrated in the area of Bagram (on the order of 60,000 to 70,000) for a strike against Kabul, they were patently too high. I believe that someone deliberately inflated the amount. Possibly to accelerate entry of the troops. The counter-revolutionary forces were indeed on the rise. This was especially true of the Jalalabad and Herat area. However, it was later determined that it was impossible for them to strike in the end of December.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] I know that it is widely said that had we not entered Afghanistan, the Americans would have done so. Mention is even made of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, which was supposedly preparing for this kind of operation. It is true that some persons consider this story to be fraudulent, others a joke, while still others tend to believe it. How do you feel about it?

[Ryabchenko] I can neither confirm nor deny it. I have no knowledge of it. However, with the situation there as a basis, I can say with complete assurance that nature abhors a vacuum. If we had not entered, someone else would have.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Let us return to the sequence of events of that time. After you studied the situation, it remained to develop the combat mission in detail and brief your subordinates. Were there any difficulties of a psychological, political, or purely tactical nature? How did the personnel receive the news of the entry into Afghanistan?

[Ryabchenko] We informed the personnel of the mission literally on the eve of the operation—24 hours before.

However, the personnel did know that the Afghan government had asked our country for assistance and that it was upon us that the honor of helping the Afghan people would fall.

The ones who were to carry out the task were made familiar with the details of the mission immediately before enplaning.

I can tell you in all honesty that at that particular time I saw no confusion or uncertainty on the part of any of my subordinates. I can say this with complete conviction, since I had spent some time in nearly all of the division's companies. I saw no signs of lack of understanding, fear, etc.—things that could concern any commander at such a time. We spoke of internationalism. The words were taken not as a brash slogan but as an accurate statement of the emotions the personnel were experiencing as they prepared to perform a proper deed. Only now is it clear that our sense of righteousness turned into doubt, that our feelings nourished idealism and ignorance in our ideas concerning the neighboring country, about the complex processes occurring there. At that time, however, we had no questions.

They were to appear later. Now, in retrospect, I cannot help but see that the idealism was not to last. As early as the end of February, the beginning of March, after we completed the first operations intended to destroy the bandit formations, the first changes in mood became apparent: Why are we here? What sense is there to our actions? Why are we becoming involved in this war? These are the most typical questions asked by the participants in the events.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] And so, you provided your subordinates with their missions. What happened next?

[Ryabchenko] The command to enplane. We arrived at the Kabul-Bagram area; the division was to land in those two places. The landing was uneventful, but a tragic event, the causes of which were extremely difficult to establish, occurred on the eve of the landing. One of our aircraft that were headed for Kabul unexpectedly lost altitude, struck a mountain, and crashed. We were not aware of the tragedy at the time of its occurrence. We were flying at night, in a definite communications mode. All of a sudden we saw an explosion in the mountains. Only after we had landed, when we saw that we were one IL-76 short, did we realize what the explosion signified. Thirty-three men perished. It was a heavy loss. Especially so if one is to consider that later on the ground, where our tasks were incomparably easier in the first few days, we suffered only one wounded.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Can you describe the actions of your subordinates in greater detail?

[Ryabchenko] It is fairly difficult to do so. I must say that our missions were specific. We were to cut off certain units. We did that. We were to detain someone. We did that, also. And so on. However, I also must say that the opposing side did not display any activity. Concerning

Kabul, much was determined by surprise. At 3 am Babrak Karmal was already delivering a radio address to the people of Afghanistan.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Could you go into greater detail? Which of your subordinates experienced the greatest difficulties?

[Ryabchenko] A separate self-propelled battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Baranovskiy performed brilliantly. Its mission was to prevent possible action by two tank columns. It did so successfully. The most difficulty was encountered by Major Zababurin's battalion. It cut off a very difficult objective. It was necessary to use weapons.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] You are speaking of the capture of the government palace?

[Ryabchenko] Yes.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] It is no secret to participants in the events that the most difficult part of the operation was the capture of the palace housing Amin, who was surrounded by a specially-trained guard force. Were you aware of that when you were briefing the battalion on the mission?

[Ryabchenko] I knew that fighting on the side of the government troops was a special subunit, the so-called "Muslim Battalion." I was to learn later at night that this was the unit—one that offered strong resistance—that we were facing.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] That meant unjustified losses. Who was to blame?

[Ryabchenko] The one who organized the operation in general. After the skirmish, I was approached by chiefs of the respective ministries and departments. I asked one of them why provision had not been made for mutual recognition and interaction signals; why we were not told what we would encounter. I did not receive a meaningful reply.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] It seems to me that in this particular phase of the operation you—the participants in the events—could have become hostages to someone's incompetence, thoughtlessness, lack of professionalism.

[Ryabchenko] I feel differently about that. The decisive role here was played by lack of coordination between ministries. Each one tried to be the first to take a bite out of the pie. Perhaps that is a crude thing to say, but I think it does express the gist of the matter. Because there were as many reports flowing to Moscow as there were "firms" participating in the events. Each one tried to show itself in the best light. Attempts were made at justification even after the skirmish: the Soviet Army was to blame, in this version. I say again: He who organized it all, he who was at the top, is the one who should settle with everything. Especially as far as this situation is concerned.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] You mention information that was sent to Moscow. But if we cite the "firms," we have the: KGB, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adviser on the CPSU line—these are definitely various ministries. And the following statement obviously does apply: It was a clear case of composing false political and military reports so typical of Brezhnev's time.

[Ryabchenko] I believe so. I recall how our ambassador, former party worker Tabeyev, stated that he was "confident" that there would be complete peace and order in Afghanistan by September. However, it was entirely obvious to us—the military—that no favorable outcome would or could be achieved by that time. We were being drawn into a protracted, senseless war which not only was bringing to naught our initial successful efforts, but also was exacerbating the situation in the republic's government, the NDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], and in the country as a whole.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Nevertheless, there was a prevailing feeling among the troops to the effect that they were to be there only a short time and should be home by 23 February at the latest.

[Ryabchenko] That is true. We all thought that. Later, when our hopes were not realized, I concluded that at least the airborne troops should depart. The point was that that was not one of our functions: waging combat against groups that were almost partisan in nature. The assistance we were rendering government troops could be understood, but the orders that were being issued at that time were straightforward: Do not invite Afghan units to combat the bandit formations; act independently. It became necessary to act.

Under those conditions, the major task was to protect people. If one is to consider that the division carried out several operations in one year, it becomes clear that this was not a simple task.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] In the life of every military man, especially a commander who has experienced a personal realization of the real dangers inherent in a combat situation, there are frightful times. What times were the most difficult for you in Afghanistan?

[Ryabchenko] There were many such times, of course. However, one of the most difficult was arriving at the evacuation hospital after returning to the post and asking: "How many?" The question referred to losses. Times like that were extremely difficult for all our commanders. It is impossible to become accustomed to the death of subordinates, especially those young enough to be your sons. However, it was even more difficult to realize that these boys would be buried in the Motherland in secret.

Who made such awful decisions? That is the question I would like answered.

[SOVETSKIY VOIN] Today one often hears it said that those who participated in the Afghan War are criminals, executioners, etc. How do you feel about such statements?

[Ryabchenko] What am I to answer to that? Give a justification? I believe that if it were not for the secret burials, if the decision to commit troops were not made behind closed doors, we would not be the object of insults in our Fatherland. Incidentally, not one civilized country has failed to honor her soldiers, regardless of the part of the world in which they served.

The vast majority of our boys that have been in Afghanistan worthily carried out their military duty. Excuse me for citing a trite expression: "Soldiers under fire do not lie." Persons under fire hold to true values: honor is honor; conscience is conscience; loyalty is loyalty. Each "Afghan" is pure in the eyes of another.

Soldiers cannot stand devoid of politics, of course. However, no one has the right to place onto their shoulders the responsibility for errors committed by politicians.

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People's Deputy On Amnesty, Treatment of Afghan Vets

90UM0251A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Finogenov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a deputy from the Communist Youth League, by I. Kondrashova, journalism department student at the All-Union Communist Youth League Central Committee Higher Komsomol School: "Timely Interview: Everyone Chooses For Himself"]

[Text] The second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet has concluded its work. On its final day, the Deputies passed a resolution on granting amnesty to former soldiers of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan who committed a crime. The resolution will take effect on December 15. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was instructed to confirm a procedure for implementing the amnesty.

Since September, in the USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee, a Deputies group has been working on the problems confronting internationalist soldiers, young people serving in the army, and young people of draft age. On the agenda today is the question of an amnesty for those who are being held prisoner by the Afghan opposition. That this problem is of concern to many people is borne out by letters the Deputies have received.

"We consider it inexpedient to take a stereotyped approach to this question, which is to say that we are against an amnesty for people who betrayed the motherland. But it is both possible and essential to resolve this

question by providing a balanced and just assessment of the war in Afghanistan. We believe that an individual approach must be taken to each prisoner of war who committed or did not commit a crime. It is necessary to secure the return of all prisoners of war to the Soviet Union, and then to take measures with respect to them."

That letter was sent to the committee by former internationalist soldiers Kurban Gurdov and Charygeldi Palayev of Ashkhabad. Afghan war veteran Vladimir Finogenov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a Deputy from the Communist Youth League, responded to it and told about the subcommittee's work.

[Finogenov] There are in the country today many unions and organizations that are working to relieve the consequences of the war in Afghanistan. Our aim is to devise a state program for solving these problems. They are many. We have identified several areas: elaboration of the political and ideological aspects of the subcommittee's work; economic questions; and the problem of benefits and decorations. It's no secret that many decorations have simply been lost. It is also important to identify internationalist soldiers' position on the nationalities question. There are instances in which Afghan war veterans are serving as a kind of "buffer" between hostile groups and in which they find themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. Nor can we overlook the fact that Afghan war veterans have raised ideological-patriotic upbringing work with teenagers to a new level. They must be supported in this. But the most important issue today is the question of an amnesty. It has already been considered at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. And it is very disappointing that the initial discussion of the matter was poorly prepared. Many forceful and emotional but not always competent statements were made. Now we are meeting with Deputies, discussing the matter with them, and explaining that the only decision that should be taken is a total amnesty.

[Kondrashova] What does this mean?

[Finogenov] I think it should mean the release from criminal liability of former soldiers who, while serving on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, were taken prisoner by the Afghan opposition, and the rehearing of criminal cases involving those who committed, after completing their service, crimes here that were connected with their stint in Afghanistan.

[Kondrashova] But how will those who returned from the war disabled view such a decision? How do you explain this step to them?

[Finogenov] It is above all an act of mercy. Mercy toward those who are in jail but who still aren't broken decisively. And indeed, it is difficult to explain to fellows who are disabled just why they shed their blood if it was possible to surrender and to be taken prisoner and to later return home safe and sound. No, we are not forgiving those who committed a crime, but we are releasing them from criminal liability. And I will never forgive a traitor, a person who went on to shoot at his

own fellows, and who caused so much pain to those mothers whose sons were killed in that war.

Today the view is being expressed that before deciding the matter of an amnesty, it is necessary to await a political assessment of the Afghan war. I am categorically against this, because a political assessment is one thing, but what does it have to do with a soldier who fulfilled his constitutional duty and now finds himself in a critical situation? I remember the words of Afghan war veteran and Deputy Viktor Yakushin: "What kind of mother abandons her child? And is she a mother in the first place? Why has our motherland forgotten our boys?"

[Kondrashova] I remember a statement made by one of the prisoners of war. He explained his decision to remain abroad this way: "Say I return today, but in two or three years perestroika comes to an end. Where would I end up?"

[Finogenov] Yes, we have the sad experience of 1945, when prisoners of war returned to the motherland and were sent off to the camps without trial or investigation. Article 264 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, under which a soldier who surrenders and is taken prisoner is to be punished by the law—up to and including the death penalty, is still on the books. True, it's said that the article is not in force... This is why we need legal guarantees in particular.

[Kondrashova] Vladimir, are statistics being kept? Do we know how many such people are being held prisoner abroad?

[Finogenov] Statistics are kept. The subcommittee has some of them at its disposal.

[Kondrashova] What are your comments on the letter the committee received? How would you respond?

[Finogenov] First of all, whether to return or not to return is a question that every person has to decide for himself. War is a sordid affair, and who today can judge what killing was justified and what killing was unjustified... That provision could be applied to anyone who saw combat. This is something that every person must decide for himself. And I would refrain for now from pinning such harsh labels on every fellow who wound up a prisoner.

[Kondrashova] Have your views on being a Deputy changed since your participation in the work of the Congress and the subcommittee?

[Finogenov] They have changed, and very greatly. I never thought it would be so hard. When I worked at a factory, I had my joys and disappointments, just like everyone. Now the gloomier side of things predominates. This is because when people come to you with their troubles, it is impossible to remain indifferent. You have to deal directly with many difficulties and problems that exist in our country.

Col Gen Tukharinov on Early Stages of Intervention in Afghanistan

90UM0197A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Col Gen Yu. V. Tukharinov, the first commander of 40th Army, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col I. Yesyutin; date and place not specified: "Commitment of Troops to Afghanistan: How It Was"]

[Text] *Ten years ago, on 25 December 1979, units of 40th Army, known as the limited Soviet Force in Afghanistan, crossed the border of our southern neighbor. As correctly noted by CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze in his speech before members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the decision for this was made behind the backs of the party and people, who were faced with a fait accompli. USSR people's deputies are called upon to provide a final political assessment of this decision by the country's higher political leadership as well as of the entire Afghan war.*

In this material we did not set the goal of analyzing the events of ten years ago. Addressing Col Gen Tukharinov, our correspondent Lt Col I. Yesyutin asked that he tell strictly about the factual side of events.

I arrived in Tashkent from the Transbaykal in September 1979, having received an advancement in service: I became first deputy commander of the Turkestan Military District. I immediately became utterly absorbed in the work, and rode and flew a great deal.

At that time we had no special discussions about Afghanistan, although like all Soviet citizens, we in the military were interested in and worried about events there. This was an ordinary level of interest, if it can be thus expressed. I emphasize that from a military standpoint we district staff officers and generals were more taken up with other concerns common for this time—the final inspection, the parade, and preparation for the new training year.

But then on 12 or 13 December (I do not remember precisely) I was summoned by District Commander Col Gen Yu. P. Maksimov. He said in a conjectural tone that the commitment of our troops to Afghanistan was being planned for the purpose of international assistance and he suggested that I become familiar with the commitment plan.

I was hardly ever at home from that day on. After familiarizing myself with the plan, I flew to the Termez area to ready troops for the upcoming commitment. But still I admit that I had a glimmer of hope that things would not come down to actual commitment.

The backbone of our 40th Army headquarters and staff was formed of officers and generals of the Turkestan Military District staff and services. As first deputy commander, I became army commander; Maj Gen A. V.

Taskayev, a person who still had frontline experience, was appointed military council member and chief of political department of the Army; Maj Gen L. N. Lobanov was appointed chief of staff; and Maj Gen A. A. Korchagin was made chief of intelligence.

The opinion exists that the contingent was deployed under conditions of strictest secrecy under the guise of an ordinary exercise. This is not so. According to our military yardsticks, preparations for committing forces to Afghanistan were conducted almost openly. Active training of unit-assigned reservists and teamwork training of subunits went on at the training grounds. Special emphasis was placed on improving march proficiency with consideration of the region's specific mountainous character.

Mobilization of personnel and equipment went normally on the whole. True, there were isolated cases of specialists and vehicles not arriving from the national economy, but these misunderstandings were promptly corrected. We were given objective assistance by the Turkestan Military District staff, headed at that time by Maj Gen G. F. Krivosheyev, and by district rear services.

The preparation for committing Soviet forces to Afghanistan also was carried out in full coordination with that country's leadership. I can refer here if only to the following example. In the morning on the eve of border crossings by units, I flew to Kunduz, where a motorized rifle division was to arrive. I was met there by Maj Gen Babajan, chief of the DRA general staff operations directorate, who arrived from Kabul especially for this occasion. I also had a meeting with Amin's older brother, Abdullah Amin, who was exercising overall leadership over Afghanistan's northern provinces. The meetings bore an official, working character and the talk there was about accommodating our units.

Meanwhile, troop preparation for crossing the Amudarya was ending in the Termez area.

The overall concept boiled down to entering DRA territory along two routes (Termez—Hairaton—Pul-i-Khumri—Kabul—Ghazni, and Kushka—Herat—Shindand—Kandahar) and thereby ringing the most vital centers of the republic. It was planned to accommodate units as garrisons in these centers and thus create conditions for supporting Afghanistan's vital activities. But the plan underwent certain changes just before the very beginning of commitment. I received an order to send the division crossing first not to Kabul, but to Kunduz. The second division was to be committed somewhat later from the Kushka axis.

In crossing the border we did not intend to engage in combat actions against detachments of the regime's enemies; it was believed that the very presence of our troops would sober the rebels. Our military assistance at that time was considered more to be a moral factor of support to the people's power.

H-hour—crossing of the Soviet-Afghan border—was planned for 1500 hours Moscow time on 25 December.

I have to say that initially there was much time wasted in crossing the Amudarya, along whose channel the border ran. The Amu is a capricious, wayward river. Its sandy banks are easily washed away by the current and the river continuously changes its channel. It was a rather complicated matter to build a pontoon bridge over it. Readied for the crossing of military equipment, the bridge proved absolutely unsuitable for this after a certain amount of time—the pontoons either came loose from shore or ran aground.

Local residents suggested a solution by demonstrating their techniques for reinforcing banks using reeds. The bridge was built absolutely openly. Everyone saw it.

Everything was ready by the designated time. USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense MSU S. L. Sokolov and Turkestan Military District Commander Col Gen Yu. P. Maksimov arrived at the army command post.

As night fell, the motorized rifle regiment's advance guard battalion approached the water's edge in infantry fighting vehicles. Border guard personnel were handed lists of personnel who were departing. The border was open. The column went onto the pontoon bridge and moved out.

Of course at that time I did not imagine that this very minute would open up the lengthy so-called Afghan war that stretched out for almost ten years. We thought that our presence in Afghanistan would be temporary and very brief, and that it would bring relief to a people friendly to us.

I did not close my eyes that night. Tank subunits went across the bridge right after the motorized rifle regiment, the division command post crossed, and other units were in readiness.

I had only a cursory acquaintance with many of the people who set off for the Afghan shore that night, but I thoroughly knew the division and regimental officers. My period of service in the district was too short for a more detailed study of my other subordinates, especially in the position of army commander. I came to know them somewhat later there in Afghanistan, on the job, as they say.

In the morning I took off in a helicopter. The columns were in movement. The equipment was moving and there were no laggard vehicles. I found the division command post at Tashkurghan. The commander briefed the situation on the route, after which I clarified the mission to be accomplished by the division. The first stage of the march did not cause particular anxiety.

Several hours later we made one more fly-by of the troops who had crossed the border, this time with Marshal Sokolov. The first landing was in Pul-i-Khumri, where one of the division columns was located. I

remember this picture well. Ubiquitous Afghan "barrels"—boys—chattered with our soldiers in the column. Older people—bearded elders and men—gathered near the commander's vehicle. Women stood to one side. There were friendly smiles on their faces and lively interest in the *shuravi* [Soviets] who had arrived.

That is how it was. Our military columns were greeted by the Afghan people with cordiality. I wish to say this unequivocally. Some speak today with distrust and an ironical smile about the first joint Saturday workdays, friendship nights, and mutual visits by delegations, but that is how it was. It is another matter that the situation subsequently changed. The reasons for this make up a special discussion.

The daylight was intended for rest, but there were few who managed to rest at that time. There was contact with the local populace, servicing of equipment, and a heap of other concerns. As I already said, units of our advance division were to proceed in the direction of Kunduz, but that evening at 1900 hours I received a new mission to turn the division toward Kabul. I tried to contact the division commander, but there were no communications. It turned out that the command post had drawn into the mountains and communications were temporarily lost as the mountains shielded the radio waves. What was to be done? When would the CP arrive in an area convenient for communications?

About 30 minutes later Marshal Sokolov inquired whether or not the new mission had been assigned to the division.

"Not yet," I responded, "in view of the absence of communications."

"Dear comrade!" I heard the marshal's voice saying, "Do you understand your personal responsibility for disrupting the mission?"

"Yes, Sir."

The marshal hung up the phone.

I of course realized the full measure of responsibility and also realized the consequences stemming from it. The division was to be in Kabul by 1700 hours on the following day (27 December). I contacted Lt Col Kasyrov, commander of the advance guard regiment. He had communications with the division commander and I assigned the new mission to the division through him. Its columns moved toward Kabul at 2000 hours.

This, the second passage, turned out to be the most difficult. Here we had to cross the high-mountain Salang. Our troops were making such a passage for the first time in all postwar times. A 94 km sector was marked on commanders' maps as especially dangerous. The road iced up at night. Wheeled equipment skidded on the ascent and tracked equipment skidded on the descent.

There was a 2,700 m long tunnel with ventilation designed for the passage of vehicles with carburetor engines, but these were diesel vehicles—infantry fighting vehicles and tanks. Gas contamination formed and drivers had to drive the equipment wearing protective masks.

The army's first large unit was in Kabul by the designated time. One other motorized rifle division entered Afghanistan through Kushka on 29 December in the form of two regiments. Its units were located in Herat and Shindand. Subsequently its zone of responsibility expanded to Kandahar. I felt a certain relief, but obviously the tension and the difficulties of march passages could not pass simply that way. At that time I was smoking two packs of cigarettes a day. I was sunburned. Then on 31 December I had a temperature of 39 and a few tenths. I got pneumonia and was hospitalized, but as soon as I came around I headed for Kabul. The army staff redeployed from Termez to Afghanistan in the first days of January of the new year of 1980.

Deep snow fell in Kabul at that time. "The Russians' brought it," said the Afghans.

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